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INTRODUCTION
International arbitrators are exceptionally talented individuals.
Most speak multiple languages.' They boast rich and multi-national
educations from the world's most prestigious universities,2 and have
vast experiences working in the highest echelons of diverse legal
systems. Their multi-faceted, multi-cultural legal training is often
supplemented by technical or industry specific expertise, and their
cumulative credentials are frequently parlayed into professorships
1. A good illustration is available on iaiparis.com, a searchable website
directory of interhational arbitrators, where it is possible to identify candidates
based on particular combinations of language competences. But even if you enter
what would seem to be improbable pairs, such as Uzbek and Spanish, or Russian
and Arabic, you can usually find a candidate. These random searches, for example,
yielded respectively Noah Rubins, an American who, in addition to Uzbek and
Spanish, is also skilled in English, French and Russian, or Samir A. Saleh, a
Lebanese and British citizen, who in addition to Russian and Arabic, is also fluent
in English and French.
2. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 18-21 (1996) (discussing and citing examples of
the importance of a prestigious education in building a career as an arbitrator).
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and enhanced by rich scholarly research.3 The most experienced of
these arbitrators are appointed and re-appointed to the most
important international disputes,4 where they resolve everything from
delicate matters of diplomacy to controversies involving sums larger
than the annual operating budget of some smaller nations. This
profile depicts the elite individuals who adjudicate virtually all
international commercial and trade-related disputes.5  But as
extraordinary as they are as individuals, their vocation as
international arbitrators remains largely undefined at either a
descriptive or a normative level.
In two other articles, one published and one forthcoming, I
propose respectively a methodology for developing clearer standards
of conduct for international arbitrators, and an approach to review of
allegations of misconduct that more accurately reflects parties'
expectations.6 This Essay takes up some questions that fall between
the cracks of those two works. The first article considers the
functional role of arbitrators in relation to the parties during the
proceedings and the ethical obligations that flow from that role, but it
does not consider their functional role in the larger systemic context,
and what additional obligations might stem from that role.
Meanwhile, my analysis in my forthcoming article of how to enforce
conduct standards does not address what consequences might apply
when arbitrators violate their ethical obligations, but their
3. See id. at 19-21 (explaining the development of the career of famous
arbitrator Pierre Lalive).
4. See id. at 35.
5. See KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 8
n.62 (1993) (citing ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG ET AL., ARITRAGERECHT 134
(1988) (estimating that 90% of all international agreements contain arbitration
clauses).
6. Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional
Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 53, 55-56
(2005) [hereinafter Rogers, Developing Standards of Conduct] (proposing a theory
and methodology for developing standards of conduct to guide international
arbitrators); see also Catherine A. Rogers, Misbehaving Arbitrators and
Consenting Parties: Enforcing Standards of Impartiality in International
Arbitration [hereinafter Rogers, Misbehaving Arbitrators] (working draft on file
with author) (explicating the distinction between standards of conduct and
standards of enforcement and proposing an approach for reconciling the two in the
context of award enforcement and in light of the parties' agreement).
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misconduct is not sufficiently egregious to warrant disqualification
or rejection of the award. Addressing these remaining issues requires
a clearer definition of the vocation of the arbitrator within the larger
international arbitration system and the market for arbitrator services.
To understand at a descriptive level how the arbitration
community is currently organized and regulated,7 I rely in Part I on
sociological frameworks that have been developed in literature on
Weberian theories of the professions. I describe how arbitrators
operate in a largely private and under-regulated market for services,
access to which is essentially controlled by what might be considered
a governing "cartel" of the most elite arbitrators. This market has
come under increased pressure in recent years because the number of
arbitrators and arbitration proceedings has increased sharply and
their work product has come under greater scrutiny. At least partially
in response to these pressures, arbitrators have begun to display a
"professional impulse,"9 meaning efforts to present themselves as a
profession. Sociological accounts of the professions tell us that in
seeking to present themselves as a profession, international
7. In the context of this Essay, I use the terms "regulate" and "regulatory" to
refer generally to all mechanisms that function to monitor and control conduct, and
not only to the more limited sense of legislatively imposed, command-and-control
mechanisms.
8. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 15 (1989) (explaining that while
there are many competing theories of the professions, the approach of Max Weber
and those who follow in his tradition conceive of the attributes of professions as
strategies to attain a competitive advantage in a relatively free market). Under this
view, "[p]rofessions are distinguished by the strategies of social closure they use to
enhance their market chances." Id. Except as otherwise indicated, in this Essay I
rely predominantly on Weberian-based conceptions of the professions.
9. I use the term "professional impulse" or "professional project" to connote
efforts to invoke the notion of professionalization, specifically through many of the
traditional markers of professionalization, such as autonomy and self-regulation
through ethical standards and organized associations. For classical definitions of
professions, see Susan M. Olson & Albert W. Dzur, The Practice of Restorative
Justice: Reconstructing Professional Roles in Restorative Justice Programs, 2003
UTAH L. REv. 57, 60; Juliana Birkoff et al., Is Mediation Really a Profession?,
DisP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2001, at 10, 11 (using Andrew Abbot's definition of a
profession to analyze mediator service and to present it as a profession to obtain
the benefits of professionalization); Herbert M. Kirtzer, Note, The Professions Are
Dead, Long Live the Professions: Legal Practice in a Postprofessional World, 33
L. & Soc'Y REv. 713, 716-18 (1999) (describing three definitions of the term
"profession").
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arbitrators are inevitably seeking to express what has developed as a
shared identity, as well as to obtain certain benefits associated with
professionalization, such as added prestige, exclusivity, and
regulatory autonomy. However, these descriptive sociological
accounts of why groups such as international arbitrators seek
professional status do not provide a very satisfying normative
justification for why they might rightly be regarded as something
other than ordinary occupations and service providers.'0
Sociological theories of the professions are helpful in
understanding how various groups are socialized to share a collective
identity and seek to gain advantages in the marketplace, but they are
inadequate for the task of providing a normative justification for
differentiating professions from other occupations and for altering
their relationship to the State." In the context of lawyers, the
proffered justification for differentiating the legal profession rests on
a "purported bargain between the profession and society in which the
profession agreed to act for the good of clients and society in
exchange for autonomy."' 2 The implied contract was said to be
premised on certain features of lawyers' work, which ostensibly
justified the bargain, namely a "community orientation" or a sense of
"altruism" that puts the good of clients and society above lawyers'
10. See Kirtzer, supra note 9, at 713-16 (outlining the traditional distinction
between service providers-which encompass accountants, consultants and
paralegals-and professionals, such as attorneys).
11. See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 200 (2001)
("Descriptive sociology enters not at the stage of providing the theory of the
concept, but at the preliminary stage of providing the raw materials about which
one is to theorize.").
12. Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discardiniz
Professional Ideolozv Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1229, 1231 (1995); see also Bernard Barber, Some Problems in the
Sociology of the Professions, in THE PROFESSIONS IN AMERICA 15, 18 (Kenneth S.
Lynn et al. eds., 1965) (describing four attributes of a profession: generalized and
systemized knowledge, community orientation, internal controls through
socialization and ethical codes, and a system of rewards). But see Kirtzer, supra
note 9, at 717 (defining the "two key elements" of a profession as being the
exclusivity of their membership and their application of abstract knowledge, but
noting that professions have added notions of altruism, regulatory autonomy and
service to these key features).
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own naked self-interest. 3 As a normative model, however, this
account turned out to be largely factually unsupportable and
conceptually faulty. While the most devastating blow may have been
a growing doubt regarding the existence of lawyers' presumed
altruism, 4 those doubts raise deeper questions about why unilateral
expressions of altruism should excuse any individual or group in
society from state regulation. 5 Instead of theories of the profession, I
offer in Part II a preliminary conceptual analysis of the normative
underpinnings of the vocation of the modern international arbitrator.
I provide an account of the justice function of modern international
arbitration (as contrasted to the dispute resolution function of
settlement and the international arbitration model of yesteryear), and
I explore what implications this distinction holds for differentiating
arbitrators' role from other legal service providers, such as attorneys.
I then explore the ways in which international arbitration is
13. For classical articulations of this position, see EMILE DURKHEIM,
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 5-13 (Cornelia Brookfield trans.,
Greenwood Press 1983); WILBERT E. MOORE, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND
RULES 13 (1970) ("A distinctive feature of full-fledged professions, noted by most
students, is a service orientation."); see also Kirtzer, supra note 9, at 729 (arguing
that the justification for insulating professions from competition is usually
"justified primarily in terms of the 'public interest' or 'public protection."'). There
are important distinctions to be made between the assertions of groups that they
possess a public-spirited commitment and the actuality of those groups' professed
commitments. Even more importantly, there is a distinction between the assertion
or actuality of those commitments and the. normative implication of those
commitments.
14. The most forceful proponents of this view are Richard Abel and Ronald
Rotunda. ABEL, supra note 8, at 35 (stating that proponents of this view "simply
assume[] that independent professionals exhibit such desirable traits and then
explore[] the threats to their hypothetical autonomy"); Ronald D. Rotunda,
Professionalism, Legal Advertising, and Free Speech in the Wake of Florida Bar v.
Went For It, Inc., 49 ARK. L. REV. 703, 713 n.36 (1997) (arguing that the only
difference between trade unions and professions is the latter's sanctimoniousness)
(citing ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY
OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE 369 (1970)); Rotunda, supra, at 706 n.10 (defining
professions as "conspiracies against the laity") (citing GEORGE BERNARD SHAW,
THE DOCTOR'S DILEMMA XV (1911)).
15. The proffered argument is that regulation is unnecessary because altruism
ensures good behavior in the absence of state oversight. While this explanation
may predict compliance and consequently provide a justification for expending
limited resources on enforcement, it does not explain why an exemption for
regulation should be created in the first place.
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developing a vibrant, if perhaps still fledgling, public realm. This
public realm is comprised of procedural and decisional commitments
to honor mandatory law claims and public policy concerns, as well as
a range of public goods that are produced not only for the
international arbitration community, but beyond. What emerges from
this analysis is an understanding that the modern international
arbitrator is not simply an instrumentality of the parties' collective
will expressed through the arbitration agreement, but instead an
integral part of a larger system that depends, in part, on them
performing their role as responsible custodians of that system.
With this background, I return in Part III to the market for
international arbitrator services, this time to evaluate it in light of
obligations and expectations attendant with their role as custodians
of the international arbitration system-a system that includes a
vibrant public realm. In the U.S. domestic arbitration context, where
arbitrators have a much narrower and less custodial role, failures to
voluntarily take up efforts at self-regulation have provoked other
potential regulators to step in to fill the perceived gap. The need for
regulation is greater in the international context because international
arbitrators operate as custodians of a system that is imperative for
international trade, but that also exceeds the easy reach of traditional
State regulatory mechanisms, and must be kept out of their grasp to
maintain its neutrality. I propose certain innovations that would
increase the rigor and transparency in the market for services and in
international arbitrators' self-regulation, improvements that may be
regarded as having been implicitly promised in existing rumblings of
professionalism, but as yet have not been fully delivered.
I. AN ABRIDGED BIOGRAPHY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATOR
The forefathers of the modern international arbitrator were a small,
intimate group of European "grand notables" or "Grand Old Men,"
as they were sometimes called, 16 who undertook the project of
16. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 34-37 (clarifying that they were
referred to in masculine terms because there were literally no women at the time,
and there still are few); see also Louise Barrington, Arbitral Women: A Study of
Women in International Commercial Arbitration, in THE COMMERCIAL WAY TO
JUSTICE: THE 1996 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE CHARTERED INSTITUTE
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forging the international arbitration system back from the 1930s
through the 1950s. Initially, they confronted a wide variety of
cultural, political, historic, practical, economic, and legal obstacles.1 7
It was the enormity of these impediments that highlighted the
creativity and ingenuity that they brought to bear on their task, which
was nothing less than creating a workable system of international
adjudication that would serve the international trade community for
generations to come.18 While this elite group was a relatively tight
league, their initial absolute control over the market for arbitrator
services seemed justified by their exceptional expertise and was
buffered by their professed approach to arbitration as "a duty, not a
career."
' 19
The international arbitrator of today inevitably retains some
characteristics of her forefathers, but she has also evolved
dramatically, in her profile, in the nature of her work, and with
respect to the system in which she operates. I render below a sketch
of the modern international arbitrator, the market she operates in, as
well as its limitations. I close by identifying efforts by international
arbitrators to cast themselves not simply as an occupation whose
product is dispute resolution services, but as a profession entitled to
all the privileges associated with that designation.
OF ARBITRATORS 229, 229-41 (Geoffrey M. Beresford Hartwell ed., 1996)
(surveying the limited participation of, systematic discrimination against, and
recent progress for women in international arbitration); K.V.S.K. Nathan, Well,
Why Did You Not Get the Right Arbitrator?, MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., July
2000, at 10 (noting that "the majority in a multi-member international arbitral
tribunal is always white" and interpreting a British arbitrator's commentary as
improperly suggesting that "arbitrators from developing countries and women
simply do not or cannot satisfy the selection criteria" for arbitrators).
17. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 773, 774 (2002).
18. See id. at 775-77. The hallmark of their success was the drafting in 1958 of
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral
Awards. June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York
Convention].
19. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 34.
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A. THE NAISSANCE OF THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATOR
With the explosion in international trade and, consequently, trade-
related disputes, the field of international arbitrators experienced
significant expansion and diversification in the past two decades.2
Even in the last ten years, there has been a near doubling in the
number of annual cases filed.21 Moreover, while international
arbitration had been a predominantly European affair, modem
pressures forced it to diversify, even if still imperfectly. New and
increased participation by developing countries, which agreed to
arbitration in order to attract foreign investment, brought new parties
to international arbitration.2 2 New entrants also came from the United
States as American companies began participating more vigorously
in international trade and American law firms took note of the large
profits to be made in providing international arbitration services.23
Both groups eventually introduced to the system "home-grown"
arbitrators, who better reflected their own expectations and legal
20. See, e.g., Elena V. Helmer, International Commercial Arbitration:
Americanize, "Civilized, "or Harmonized?, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 35, 38
(2003) (citing various statistics, including those indicating that "two-thirds of all
cases brought to ICC arbitration arose in the last 20 years of its 75-year existence")
(quoting W. LAWRENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
ARBITRATION 2 (3d ed. 2000)).
21. TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH app. A (R. Naimark & Christopher R. Drahazol eds., 2005).
22. See Arthur D. Harverd, The Concept of Arbitration and Its Role in Society,
in THE COMMERCIAL WAY TO JUSTICE 17, 20-22 (Geoffrey M. Beresford Hartwell
ed., 1997); Donald Francis Donovan, International Commercial Arbitration and
Public Policy, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 645, 650-51 (1995); see also
Legalization of International Arbitration in Turkey, 10 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION
REP. 209 (1999) ("The Turkish parliament's decision to approve a constitutional
amendment allowing for international arbitration in investment disputes should
attract foreign investors to the multi-billion dollar energy projects currently
awaiting funding .... ."); David L. Gregory, The Internationalization of
Employment Dispute Mediation, 14 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 2, 15 (2001) (discussing
the potential for China to develop a more reliable international arbitration
enforcement record).
23. Carbonneau, supra note 17, at 778 ("[L]eading international lawyers on
Wall Street [eventually realized] that transborder arbitration was a force to be
reckoned with in international commerce."); Helmer, supra note 20, at 40
(reporting that since the 1970s and early 1980s, "[t]he number of American law
firms and lawyers offering arbitration services (either as counsel or, in the case of
individuals, also as arbitrators) is on the rise").
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cultures, 24 although a new generation of European arbitrators had
also come of age.
Another important trend, related to the expansion and
diversification of the field of international arbitrators, is that they
have also become more expressly entrepreneurial. As premier
arbitrator Jan Paulsson has explained, "the age of innocence has
come to an end ... [and] the delightful discipline of a handful of
academic aficionados ... has become a matter of serious concern for
great numbers of professionals determined to master a process
because it is essential to their business. 26 Arbitrators typically earn
lavish fees, 27 and as a consequence, the new international arbitrator
has been said to regard her position as a primarily entrepreneurial
venture.2" The consequences of these trends are that international
arbitrators are less constrained by shared traditions or by an inherent
sense of obligation, which means ultimately that they are less subject
24. With regard to developing countries, local arbitrators were regarded as
necessary to counter-balance what was regarded as biased Western-centric visions
that European tribunals imposed in earlier arbitrations. See, e.g., Ahmed Sadek El-
Kosheri, Is There a Growing International Arbitration Culture in the Arab-Islamic
Juridicial Culture?, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: TOWARDS AN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CULTURE 47, 47-48 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed.,
1998) (noting that, despite the long history and current popularity of arbitration in
Arab nations, the Arab legal community remains hostile toward transnational
arbitration because of biased treatment by Western arbitrators); John Beechey,
International Commercial Arbitration: A Process Under Review and Change,
DisP. RESOL. J., Aug.-Oct. 2000, at 32, 33 (explaining that there "remains a huge
task" to convince developing nations that they can expect a fair hearing before
international arbitration tribunals); DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 43-45.
25. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 34-37.
26. Id. at 37. In a similar vein, David Hacking reflects, "The small community
of international arbitrators, who know and trust one another, is gone. Peer-group
control will no longer be here to preserve the 'ethics' of international arbitration."
David Hacking, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility: A Response: What Happens if the
Icelandic Arbitrator Falls Through the Ice?, 15 J. INT'L ARB. 73, 77 (1998).
27. See John Yukio Gotanda, Awarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees in
International Commercial Arbitrations, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1999) (noting
that fees can run into the millions of dollars).
28. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 34-36 (asserting that the new
generation of international arbitrators view their predecessors as amateurish and
idealistic).
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to the informal social controls that operated when the community
was still comprised of an elite in-group.
B. THE IMPERFECT MARKET FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATOR
SERVICES
While the number of arbitrators has expanded, two major factors
impede the development of a competitive and open market for
arbitration services.2 9 First, even with expansion, the field continues
to be dominated by an elite group of insiders who are variously,
though not without objection, referred to as a "cartel," a "club,"30 or a
"mafia."3 1 These individuals, both through informal processes and
their effective control over arbitral institutions, exert significant
influence over who gets appointed as an arbitrator.32 Arbitrator
selection is often in the hands of members of the same "club," who
are either operating in the institutions or already appointed as party-
appointed arbitrators. In either situation, they are likely to favor other
"members" of their "club."33 This effect is compounded by the fact
29. See Alan Scott Rau, The Arbitrability Question Itself, 10 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 287, 365 n.218 (1999) (doubting the existence of competitive forces in the
market for arbitrators).
30. Iran-United States, Case No. A/18, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 251, 336
(1984) (describing "'professional' arbitrators" as "forming an exclusive club in the
international arena" and as being "automatically brought into almost any major
dispute by the operation of predetermined methods") (cited in Detlev F. Vagts, The
International Legal Profession. A Need for More Governance?, 90 AM. J. INT'L L.
250, 250 (1996)).
31. See Jan Paulsson, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility, 14 J. INT'L ARB. 13, 19 (1997)
(arguing against the term "mafia").
32. See Lucy F. Reed, Drafting Arbitration Clauses, in INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESs LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 2002, at 553, 577 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 670, 2002) (noting that "parties locked in a
dispute are rarely able to come to such an agreement" about who should preside
over an arbitration). Under some rules, such as those of the ICC, a sole arbitrator or
the chairperson is generally appointed by the institution in the absence of the party
agreement because, after a dispute has arisen, it is relatively rare that the parties
agree about the nature and identity of the person best suited to preside. Id. Under
other rules, or by party agreement, arbitral chairpersons are appointed by the party-
appointed arbitrators. See Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX.
L. REv. 485, 497-98 (1997).
33. As Dezalay and Garth describe, there is a "mixing of roles," such that:
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that prior service as an arbitrator is the preeminent qualification for
an arbitrator-candidate.34 As a result, the market for international
arbitrators operates as a relatively closed system that is difficult for
newcomers to penetrate.35
In addition to the significant barriers to entry, there are also severe
information asymmetries that prevent the market for arbitrator
services from being fully competitive. While there is a notable trend
to change the status quo, which is described in greater detail below,36
most arbitration is confidential, most awards are not published, and
most institutional decisions regarding challenges to arbitrators are
rendered without reasoned explanation and without publication.37
[T]he same individuals who belong to the networks around the central
institutions of arbitration are found in the roles of lawyers, co-arbitrators, or
chairs of the arbitral tribunal. The principal players therefore acquire a great
familiarity with each other, and they develop also, we suspect, a certain
connivance with respect to the role held by the adversary of the moment.
DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 49. This conclusion is based on reports from
several arbitration insiders, one of which claims, "Now why is it a mafia? It's a
mafia because people appoint one another. You always appoint your friends-
people you know." Id. at 50. Another more junior member described how "'[tihey
nominate one another. And sometimes you're counsel and sometimes you're
arbitrator."' Id. It is precisely this practice that has given rise to calls for arbitrator
candidates to disclose prior service and relationships with counsel and other
arbitrators. See Lucy Reed & Jonathan Sutcliffe, The "Americanization" of
International Arbitration?, MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., April 2001, at 11, 37 &
n.44 (describing differences between American and European perspectives about
the importance of disclosing relationships with counsel and other arbitrators).
34. See Eric W. Lawson, Jr., Arbitrator Acceptability: Factors Affecting
Selection, ARB. J., Dec. 1981, at 23 (arguing that previous service as an arbitrator
"is the sine qua non, for there is no other recognized route of entry into the
profession of arbitration").
35. Dezalay and Garth provide an explanation for what appears to be a
contradiction between expansion of the field, on the one hand, and barriers to entry
and maintenance of control by a tight in-group on the other. They explain that the
influx of newcomers, while participating intermittently in individual arbitrations,
remain on the periphery of the field of international arbitration practice. DEZALAY
& GARTH, supra note 2, at 37.
36. See infra notes 145-153 and accompanying text.
37. See W. LAWRENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN PAULSSON,
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION § 13.03 (3d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter ICC ARBITRATION] (noting that despite acknowledged ambiguities in
terms like "independent," the ICC has declined to publish criteria defining the
meaning of such terms or adopt the IBA's guidelines in this area). One notable
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The combined effect of these features creates significant information
asymmetries that impair parties' ability to make fully informed
decisions in selecting arbitrators.38
The only apparent respite from this cone of silence, when an
arbitrator is challenged in a judicial proceeding at the award
enforcement stage, is not as effective a resource as might be
imagined. In that situation, information may be publicly available,
but it is not readily accessible to most parties. In the United States
and most other common law jurisdictions, judicial opinions are
published and (particularly in the United States) are electronically
searchable. As a result, if an arbitrator candidate's conduct or work
product had been the subject of challenge in a U.S. court, an English-
speaking party (or their English-speaking counsel) has access to the
relevant information. Absent these preconditions, however,
linguistic, cultural, and practical barriers present formidable
obstacles to the decisional history and past conduct of arbitrator
candidates. As a result, typically information about an arbitrator's
conduct and decisional track record (as well as anecdotal information
that might be useful in the selection process) is available to a
relatively closed circle of arbitration insiders who treat such
information as proprietary.3 9
exception to opacity of institutional challenge procedures is the CPR, which
publishes the specific procedures used for evaluating challenges to arbitrators,
even if it appears that the outcome of those procedures remain unpublished.
38. This observation has frequently been confirmed:
Acquiring information about arbitrators is costly, and parties may not have
substantial resources to invest in learning about the reputations of arbitrators
or arbitral institutions. Moreover, arbitrations often take place under the guise
of confidentiality, so even assuming that a party were willing to undertake the
investment, the party may be stymied in its efforts to learn much about an
arbitrator's or an institution's reputation.
Peter B. Rutledge, Toward a Contractual Approach for Arbitral Immunity, 39 GA.
L. REv. 151, 195 (2004).
39. As one commentator explains:
Not surprisingly, there are potential difficulties in obtaining anecdotal
information about arbitrator candidates. Some individuals and firms regard
this information as confidential or proprietary; some limit the availability of
this type of intelligence to a circle of close, professional friends or colleagues;
and in a day when everyone is bombarded by unwanted inquiries, there may
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C. THE IMPERFECT REGULATION OF THE IMPERFECT MARKET
Market imperfections usually signal a need for correction through
regulation. Notwithstanding the limitations and distortions in the
market for arbitrator services, however, it remains a largely under-
regulated market.40 The role of national courts is intentionally
minimized in the international arbitration context to insulate
decision-making processes from national bias or interference, 41 and
legislatures' support for international arbitration has traditionally
be resistance to the effort involved in digging out and forwarding such
information, even when there is no other reason to withhold it.
Francis 0. Spalding, Selecting the Arbitrator, What Counsel Can Do, ADR
CURRENTS, Fall 1997, at 8, reprinted in WHAT THE BUSINESS LAWYER NEEDS TO
KNOW ABOUT ADR 351, 355 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook
Series No. 578, 1998).
40. See, e.g., Dora Marta Gruner, Note, Accounting for the Public Interest in
International Arbitration: The Need for Procedural and Structural Reform, 41
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 923, 962 (2003) (proposing, among other things, an
international regulatory body that would monitor arbitrators and assure their
expertise and integrity). Concerns about under-regulation can also be seen as the
motivation behind calls for an elimination or diminution in the immunity afforded
to arbitrators. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Liability of International Arbitrators:
A Comparative Analysis and Proposal for Qualified Immunity, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 2-3 (2000); Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral
Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV.
449, 460 (2004). Most calls for arbitrator certification or licensing have arisen in
the context of domestic arbitration, where the concerns raised by non-regulation
are arguably much more severe and the prospect of licensure or certification is
much more feasible. See, e.g., David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory
Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath
Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73,
126-28 (1999) (proposing arbitrator licensing and oversight mechanisms for
employment discrimination claims); Theodore A. Levine & Peter R. Cella,
Arbitrator Training and Selection, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1679 (1995) (discussion
of same regarding securities arbitration); Nicole Buonocore, Resurrecting a Dead
Horse-Arbitrator Certification as a Means to Achieve Diversity, 76 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 483, 483, 496 (1999) (proposing certification for labor arbitrators
as a way to promote diversity); David A. Hoffian, Certifying ADR Providers, B.
B.J., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 9. While there are inevitably multiple reasons why
academic interest in regulation of international arbitrators has been relatively
muted, including the -fact that they may be considered more competent than their
domestic counterparts, the topic may also be less appealing to the primary authors
of most articles on international arbitration, who are themselves practicing
international arbitrators.
41. See Franck, supra note 40, at 27.
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taken the form of policies of non-interference. 42 As a result, the
primary regulators of international arbitrators are the arbitral
institutions, the most eminent being the International Chamber of
Commerce in Paris, the London Court of International Arbitration,
and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.
Within the framework of arbitral institutions, arbitrators are
formally regulated through institutional appointment procedures,
party selection procedures, and challenge procedures. 43 As described
above, in practice the appointment process places a significant
premium on pre-existing membership in the "club." This practice
does not mean that favoritism displaces all forms of quality control
because both arbitrators and institutions have reputations that may be
damaged in the long-term by repeated appointment of incompetent or
overtly corrupt arbitrators. 44 But it does seem fair to assume that
42. See Gruner, supra note 40, at 924.
43. Arbitral institutions may also exercise some general oversight functions,
such as ensuring arbitrators make timely decisions. The most active regulator in
this regard is the ICC, which not only remains relatively involved in administering
the arbitration, but also reviews the substance of the award to ensure coherence and
to control against basic errors.
44. As described .in more detail below, there are significant reasons to doubt
the efficacy of reputational sanctions for arbitral institutions. Arbitral institutions
are move visible than arbitrators, and therefore would seem more readily subject to
market reaction, but that hypothesis may be overly optimistic given how arbitral
clauses, where institutions are selected, are drafted. Anecdotal evidence and my
own personal experience suggest that many, if not most, international arbitration
clauses are drafted by corporate lawyers or non-lawyer businesspersons who have
little or no dispute resolution experience and conduct little or no research. See
Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 665, 682
(1994) (suggesting that there are limits to what professionals can do without
jeopardizing their own collegial relationships and referral networks); Donald I.
Baker & Mark R. Stabile, Arbitration of Antitrust Claims: Opportunities and
Hazards for Corporate Counsel, 48 Bus. LAW. 395, 413 (1993) (noting that
arbitration clauses, even by companies as large as Union Carbide, are often
"included in agreements almost as afterthoughts"). To some extent, this trend is
changing, but there are a number of historical examples that suggest there is
significant room for concern. One particularly illustrative example involved a
Canadian company that was persuaded to designate the Centre national
d'arbitrage ("CAN") as the arbitral institution to administer any dispute that arose.
When a dispute arose, CAN ordered the Canadian company to pay upwards of 90
million francs in damages. As it turned out, the institution was a non-existent front
put forth by the opposing party in an effort to defraud the Canadian company. See
W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
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membership in the same club may dim otherwise more vigilant
efforts to gauge quality, assess shortcomings, or privilege rival
newcomers.
45
Arbitral institutions' disclosure and disqualification rules and
procedures also operate as a source of regulation.46 As I have argued
elsewhere, however, many of the disclosure and disqualification
standards are precariously indeterminate,47 with the result being that
too much discretion is vested in arbitrators' exercise of their
judgment at a time they have a heightened self-interest in being
retained.48  Exacerbating this problem, arbitral institutions
CASES, MATERIALS AND NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
DISPUTES 542-43 (1997). While this example is unusual in that it involves
intentional deceit, with some degree of regularity and on their own volition, parties
designate nonexistent institutions or misname the institution they intend to
designate. See ICC ARBITRATION, supra note 37 (providing multiple examples of
clauses in which parties designated non-existent arbitral institutions and discussing
the jurisdictional problems that arise as a result).
45. Notably, only a few arbitral institutions have express policies of refusing to
reappoint arbitrators who have been found to have violated their codes of ethics or
arbitral rules. See American Arbitration Association, Failure to Disclose May Lead
to Removal From the National Roster of Neutrals [hereinafter AAA, Failure to
Disclose], at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22241 (last visited Aug. 28, 2005);
Camera Arbitrale Nazionale e Internationale Milano, Code of Ethics of
Arbitrators, art. 13 [hereinafter Arbitrator Code of Ethics] (noting that an arbitrator
who doesn't apply with the Code of Ethics will be replaced and may also be
refused participation in future proceedings because of the violation), at
http://www.camera-arbitrale.it/show.jsp?page= 169945 (last visited June 26, 2005).
46. See, e.g., Arbitrator Code of Ethics, supra note 45, art. 7, § 2 (requiring that
arbitrator-candidates disclose "any facts or circumstances which might be of such a
nature as to call into question the arbitrator's independence in the eyes of the
parties"). Article 7, section 3 also requires disclosure of similar information
discovered later in the proceedings.
47. See Rogers, Developing Standards of Conduct, supra note 6, at 71-72
(arguing that even if phrased as an objective standard, the ICC standard for
disclosure affords arbitrators tremendous discretion because it is framed as a vague
qualitative standard and not as a requirement for disclosure of clearly identified
categories of information).
48. As I have previously argued:
A decision to disclose a conflict or withdraw based on a challenge can result
in the arbitrator having to forego or relinquish hundreds of thousands dollars
in potential fees. The process of evaluating a potential conflict of interest, in
other words, is itself infected with palpable self-interest.
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intentionally maintain as secret the reasoning underlying their rulings
on arbitrator challenges, even as against the parties, and arbitral rules
grant institutions the exclusive power to interpret and apply their
own rules,49 thus insulating their decisions from any later judicial
oversight.
Courts reviewing final arbitral awards, meanwhile, have an
intentionally minimal role to play, and are particularly ill-suited to
provide substantive oversight of arbitrators." The standards for
national court review of arbitral awards were designed with a strong
pro-enforcement bias, which severely limits the grounds for refusal
to enforce." The purpose of the pro-enforcement bias is to avoid
having the substantive decision-making effectively shifted back to
national courts under the guise of award review, with attendant risk
that awards would have less currency.52 The effect, however, is that
only the most odious incidents of arbitrator misconduct are captured
in the intentionally porous review standards.
One other way national courts might become involved in
regulating international arbitrators might be through professional
49. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GUIDE TO ICC
ARBITRATION 35 (1994) (noting that with challenges to international arbitrators,
the decisions of the ICC Court of Arbitration "on all such questions are final and
the reasons for the Court's decisions are not communicated").
50. See id. at 77; Rogers, Misbehaving Arbitrators, supra note 6.
51. Courts in the enforcement jurisdiction can only refuse to enforce arbitral
awards based on one of five narrowly defined procedural grounds or two additional
catch-all provisions that protect national interests of the enforcement jurisdiction
(that the issue in dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration or offends the
public policy). New York Convention, supra note 18, art. V. These grounds are
intentionally limited to what might be considered the "most basic notions of
morality and justice," William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice:
Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REv.
647, 649 (1989), in order to avoid shifting decisionmaking power back to national
courts under the guise of award review. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF
CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION & ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND
REPAIR 113 (1992).
52. See Rogers, Misbehaving Arbitrators, supra note 6 (elaborating analogous
arguments against vesting in national institutions regulatory authority over
attorneys' activities in international arbitration).
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liability lawsuits brought by aggrieved parties.53 Liability controls,
however, are neither widely available nor particularly effective in the
international arbitration context. In many countries, arbitrators are
either absolutely immune from liability or are qualifiedly immune,
meaning they can only be held liable in narrow situations usually
involving intentional; bad faith malfeasance or unjustified
withdrawal. 4 There are solid reasons for this immunity, most
importantly a need to avoid having claims against the arbitrator
substitute for a substantive appeal of the award.5 Once again,
however, the effect of these protections against liability is that only
rare examples of arbitrator misconduct are actionable.
Reputational sanctions are another form of control frequently
proposed as an alternative to formal regulation.56 While theoretically
possible, reputational sanctions are not feasible in light of the
information asymmetries and market distortions described above.
Although academic scholars occasionally assume away information
asymmetries to make the elegant simplicity of their theories seem
more plausible,57 the potential for information asymmetries in
international arbitration is dramatically magnified because of
political, geographic, cultural, and linguistic barriers. In addition to
53. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV.
799, 806-07 (1992) (describing "liability controls" as alternatives to formal
discipline as a means of regulating lawyer conduct).
54. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 40, at 6-15 (surveying the laws of Germany,
Turkey, Qatar, Libya, Argentina, Lebanon and Spain, among others); see also
Mark W. Levine, The Immunity of Arbitrators and the Duty to Disclose, 6 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 197, 204-05 (1995).
55. Other arguments invoked to justify arbitrator immunity involve analogies
to their judicial counterparts, who enjoy judicial immunity. See Franck, supra note
40, at 18-19. As I have argued elsewhere, the judicial analogy does more to
confuse than to clarify issues involving the role of international arbitrators. See
Rogers, Developing Standards of Conduct, supra note 6, at 83. Concerns are also
raised that liability concerns will negatively affect arbitrator decision-making or
diminish the pool of individuals willing to act as arbitrators.
56. Cf Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm
Structure, 84 VA. L. REv. 1707, 1756-57 (1998) (discussing information
asymmetries as an obstacle to development of market-based substitutes for
attorney ethics).
57. See, e.g., Rutledge, supra note 38, at 199 ("[This article] assumes that these
participants [in arbitration] have perfect information about the market.").
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information asymmetries, other dynamics may constrict the flow of
information about arbitrator transgressions. In the analogous context
of the market for lawyer services, professional and psychological
barriers often prevent lawyers from reporting perceived misconduct
by other lawyers." While there has been no comparable empirical
research in the international arbitration context, it seems reasonable
to infer that these forces may be even more formidable obstacles for
arbitrator self-policing. Unlike attorneys, who compete more directly
for business, international arbitrators rely directly, if not explicitly,
on other arbitrators and arbitration specialists for their business.5 9
At a more systemic level, there may also be incentives for those in
the "governing cartel" to avoid "outing" deviant arbitrators and
decrying their decisional products as invalid for fear of injuring the
legitimacy or perceptions of legitimacy of the international
arbitration system. Intuitively, as noted above, the arbitrators and
institutions who comprise the inside core of the international
arbitration community could not repeatedly appoint or recommend
corrupt or incompetent arbitrators without themselves suffering
negative consequences. As a result, internal, informal sanctioning
may still exact a toll on transgressing arbitrators, but there remain
significant obstacles to reputational sanctions meaningfully
regulating the larger market for international arbitrators.
This introduction to the international arbitrator and the market in
which she operates is admittedly incomplete. Another important
trend, which acts to counterbalance some of the problems described
above, is a shift toward the "professionalization" of international
arbitrators.
58. See Rhode, supra note 44, at 681-82, 702-03 (suggesting that such issues as
the importance of maintaining collegial relationships and the negative perception
of whistle-blowing deter lawyers from reporting other lawyers' misconduct).
59. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 50 (finding that several of those
interviewed confirmed the interdependence of arbitrators).
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D. THE PROFESSIONAL IMPULSE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATORS
There is no universally accepted sociological definition of a
"profession,' 6° and some claim that the term is not a legitimate
descriptive category, but is instead a subterfuge for advancing the
economic ambitions of those invoking it.6 Nevertheless, the term
undeniably connotes prestige, and it has some universally recognized
core markers that those pursuing such prestige invoke in an attempt
to distinguish themselves from other occupations.62 I do not seek to
evaluate whether international arbitrators actually satisfy the criteria
for any particular definition of a profession, 63 but rather to suggest
60. Compare Barber, supra note 12, at 18, with Kirtzer, supra note 9, at 717
(defining the "two key elements" of a profession as being the exclusivity of their
membership and their application of abstract knowledge, but noting that
professions have added notions of altruism, regulatory autonomy and service to
these key features).
61. Ronald Rotunda argues that the term is simply a tool to rationalize anti-
competitive behavior that would otherwise not be tolerable and insulate members
from ordinary standards of care. Rotunda, supra note 14, at 706.
62. See id. at 705 (proposing that many occupations seek to be recognized as a
profession, and occupations already acknowledged as a profession jealously guard
their status). Many commentators agree that the rise from "occupation" to
"profession" carries a number of necessary corollaries, including the concept that it
is appropriate for a profession to impose entry restrictions, and engage in price
fixing, peer review, and the elimination or regulation of advertising. Id. at 705-06.
63. The international arbitrator community has several other inherent features
of a profession that, while some regard them as important to the project of defining
whether a group belongs to the category of "professions," are not particularly
relevant to my project. One example is that members of a profession are "bound by
a sense of identity" and operate within "fairly clear social boundaries." See
William J. Good, Community Within a Community.: The Professions, 22 AM. SOC.
REv. 194-200 (1957) (quoted in MAGLI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF
PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 55 (1977)); ABEL, supra note 8, at
37. Also, the 'rationalization' of arbitration know-how" may be seen as part of the
effort to transform an artisanry into mass production under Weberian visions of the
professions. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 37. Finally, they similarly
transitioned from a sense of duty to a more expressly entrepreneurial orientation.
See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Faith in Legal Professionals: Believers and Heretics,
61 MD. L. REv. 217 (characterizing the noted decline in the "professionalism"
legal practice as demonstrated by a shift from an "honorable calling" to a
commercial business activity). Similarly, the Special Committee on
Professionalism of National Academy of Arbitrators summarized:
[T]here are those among us who view arbitration primarily as a business.
They are likely to concentrate more on self-interest than the interest of the
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that international arbitrators demonstrate some of the markers of
professionalization and have consciously invoked the nomenclature
of professionalism. Regardless of their actual status, this professional
impulse spotlights international arbitrators' conduct, 6 and, since
professionalization implies self-regulation, it may create unfounded
expectations about arbitrator self-regulation that have not fully
matured.
1. Controlling Membership
According to most sociological profiles, one of the hallmark
features of a profession, as part of its efforts to self-regulate, is an
effort to control entry to the profession, either formally or
informally.65 These efforts are often undertaken for the stated
purpose of protecting the public from incompetent practitioners, even
if critics often contend that they also represent an effort to limit
competition both from within the field and without.66 As noted
above, international arbitrators have been a relatively closed
community, with entry controlled not by formal licensing, but
through screening and promotion in an informal, tight-knit
community.
profession .... We recognize that arbitrators are no less ambitious than other
professionals; we recognize that many of us are dependent on arbitration fees
for a livelihood.
REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONALISM OF NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS, at E-l, E-4 (Bureau of Nat'l Aff., Daily Lab. Rep. No. 106, June 4,
1987) (cited in Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, S. TEX. L. REv. 485
(1997)).
64. For example, sometimes professional status is expressly invoked as an
argument against the need for formal regulation. See Ali Malek QC & David
Quest, Partiality of Barrister Arbitrators: A Response to Dr. K. V S. K. Nathan,
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., Spring 2000, at 15, 22 (arguing in response to
criticism of possible arbitrator bias based on social relationships that "it should be
assumed that a professional arbitrator, even if he meets an advocate socially in
chambers, will not discuss the case any more than he would with an acquaintance
at another chambers or in firm of solicitors") (emphasis added).
65. See ABEL, supra note 8, at 27 (noting that entry restrictions to a profession
may be "formal or informal, visible or invisible" but "their principle object is to
protect members from competition with each other as well as with outsiders"
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Some recent developments suggest an effort to signal formal
control over entry. Many existing arbitral institutions, such as the
International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") and the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA"), now offer new training programs
for those wishing to become international arbitrators.67 Several other
organizations, such as iaiparis.com, have begun creating registers or
rosters of eligible international arbitrators. While undoubtedly
helpful at resolving some of the market failures described above, that
does not seem to be their only purpose. By invoking designations
such as "institutes" with "members," these resources imply the
trappings of professional licensing, suggesting exclusivity and a
substantive process of selecting. Making these implications more
explicit, many of these resources assert that their aim is to improve
quality and increase transparency in arbitrator selection,68 which
suggests a commitment to larger systemic goals of the sort often
invoked by professions to justify the exclusivity of their
organizations. In other words, they suggest a form of control over
who becomes a part of the community of international arbitrators as
part of a larger effort to protect the public.
These resources undoubtedly provide a valuable service in helping
to rectify some of the market failures described earlier. They make
various individuals readily identifiable, whereas in years past the
same information would have to be gathered in costly piecemeal
efforts, often by word of mouth.69 By creating broader access in a
67. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 47 (arguing that the expansion of
bureaucracy at the ICC is part of a concerted "effort to bring in newcomers").
68. See, e.g., International Arbitration Institute, Chairman's Message:
Emmanuel Gaillard (explaining that the purpose of the site and the "Institute" is to
"promote transparency in the international arbitration community" and provide
previously unavailable "access to the international arbitration community itself'),
at http://www.iaiparis.com/pages-p-html.asp (last visited June 30, 2005); Juris
Publishing, Roster of International Arbitrators [hereinafter Roster], at
http://www.jurispub.com/books.asp?id= 164 (last visited August 21, 2005).
69. See supra notes 37-39 and surrounding text (noting that the confidential
character of most arbitration proceedings and a general dearth of public
information regarding individual arbitrators has made it difficult for clients to
make informed decisions in choosing arbitrators). The Roster of International
Arbitrators expressly advertises itself as providing relief for parties "frustrated in
their desire to collect the names of all persons who deserve consideration." The
advertisement states:
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"competitive" context to a wide range of candidates, particularly new
candidates,70 these resources significantly reduce the costs of
identifying potential candidates, and they may effectively diminish
the less meritocratic forces of the so-called "favor bank"'" that have
prevailed as a primary mechanism determining who is selected to
serve as an arbitrator.
Notwithstanding these benefits, however, it is unclear to what
extent some of these resources operate as much more than an elite
and sophisticated version of The Yellow Pages. While these
directories imply, through their invocation of professional
nomenclature, that those listed have been selected through some sort
of quality control screening, it is not entirely certain what, if any,
substantive minimum requirements exist. Selection criteria appear to
be primarily quantitative, measured by a certain number of
experiences as an arbitrator. While undoubtedly valuable information
about a candidate, the number of prior appointments is not
necessarily an accurate gauge of quality given the self-referential
nature of the appointment process. Nor is it the most valuable
information about arbitral candidates.
My point is not to detract from the utility of these resources, which
are unquestionably valuable, or to question the competency of those
listed, who as noted in the Introduction include some exceptionally
talented individuals. My point is only to highlight the professional
rhetoric employed by these sources. Even if they are predominately
creating a marketing device, their notable restraint and subtlety are
consistent with a professional impulse. Self-imposed restraints on
It is impossible, even for the most active and wide-ranging lawyer, to obtain
on his own appropriate information on possible candidates. He may consult
others, but their knowledge will also be limited. Furthermore, international
arbitration awards are most frequently kept confidential, so that outsiders
cannot judge arbitrators by the products of their performances. Institutions
engaged in administering international arbitrations normally keep their lists
confidential. In any event, these lists are not the products of the kind of
comprehensive, and therefore costly and time consuming, search for eligible
candidates that we conducted for the publication of this volume.
Roster, supra note 68.
70. International Arbitration Institute, New Members Listing, at
http://iaiparis.com/portrait.asp?Id=newmem (last visited August 21, 2005).
71. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 51.
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advertising or controls on fees, such as the apparently wide-spread
reluctance to charge cancellation or commitment fees,72 are
consistent with efforts by groups to enhance their professional
status.73
2. Codes of Ethics and Self-Regulation
Another factor scholars point to as a measure of a profession is
that they create their own ethical standards, often compiled in a code,
to articulate and govern the conduct of their members. 74 These codes
then provide a basis for self-regulation, which is considered both one
of the independent features of any profession and one of the goals of
professionalization projects.75 For many sociologists, self-regulation
through a code of ethics is the definitive characteristic of a
profession,76 and for international arbitrators, it is one of the most
visible.
The process of formalizing ethical rules and self-regulation usually
begins when informally enforced shared social norms begin to break
down.77 In the community of international arbitrators, it was
72. In an extensive survey, John Gotanda documents that, notwithstanding an
absence of legal and ethical prohibitions, most arbitrators do not charge
cancellation fees, and many regard them as "immoral." John Yukio Gotanda,
Setting Arbitrators' Fees: An International Survey, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
779, 797 (2000). These attitudes and behaviors are similar to the "widespread
convention that lawyers and physicians do not discuss fees in advance." ABEL,
supra note 8, at 27-28.
73. Such restrictions are common among various professions, and economists
have confirmed that advertising bans and fee schedules increase consumer prices.
ABEL, supra note 8, at 27-28.
74. See MOORE, supra note 13, at 116 ("One prominent way in which
professional associations operate as agencies of self-regulation is in the
development of codes of conduct."); Barber, supra note 12, at 18.
75. Michael J. Powell, Professional Divestiture: The Cession of Responsibility
for Lawyer Discipline, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 31, 31-32 (1986) (reporting
that sociologists regard self-regulation as the defining characteristic of a
profession).
76. See ABEL, supra note 8, at 37 (describing the role of self-regulation in a
"structural functionalist" model of the professions).
77. See Detlev F. Vagts, The International Legal Profession: A Need for More
Governance?, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 250, 250 (1996) (noting that in the early
American legal profession, "[t]here [were] only a few persons in the profession
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precisely when the community expanded and shared understandings
dwindled that several codes were developed.78 The first code of
ethics for international arbitrators,79 developed in 1987 by the
International Bar Association ("IBA"), is called the IBA Rules of
Ethics for Arbitrators ("IBA Code"). It is a voluntary code that must
be adopted by the parties to be applicable. 80 More recently, several
newer institutions outside of the mainstream of European
international arbitration circles have introduced codes,8' and the IBA
has revised and updated its Code to coincide with more modem
and they kn[e]w what they [were] supposed to do. In the rare case that somebody
[was] tempted to lapse from grace, the prospect of disapproval by one's peers
[was] deterrence enough").
78. See Martin Hunter, Ethics of the International Arbitrator, 53 ARB. 219, 220
(1987) (concluding the world of commercial arbitration to be no longer a club of
gentlemen, but one that needs explicit guidelines for conduct).
79. An earlier code for arbitrators was not directed at international arbitrators,
but domestic arbitrators. Not surprisingly, it was promulgated by a joint committee
that included an already established professional organization, the American Bar
Association, and the American Arbitration Association. James H. Carter,
Introductory Note, 26 I.L.M. 583 (providing an introduction to the International
Bar Association's Guidelines for International Arbitrators). It is also not surprising
that the first of such codes was an initiative by Americans, who have been historic
frontrunners in the promulgation of formal, written ethical codes and are regarded
as the most fastidious about conflicts of interest. See Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy
Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of Understanding the Differences in
Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by US. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1117, 1150 (1999) (noting that in some countries, professional
ethics are handed down as an oral tradition, whose strictures address only the most
obvious conflicts of interest).
80. See Hans Smit, A-National Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REv. 629, 631 (1989)
(proposing language by which ethical codes can be incorporated in the arbitration
agreement); Dr. lur. Oliver Dillenz, Drafting International Commercial
Arbitration Clauses, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 221, 250 n.71 (suggesting
contract language for parties to incorporate the International Bar Association's
Ethics for International Arbitrators into their agreements).
81. See, e.g., American Arbitration Association, The Code of Ethics for
Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21958 (last
visited June 30, 2005); Milan Chamber of Commerce, International Arbitration
Rules: Code of Ethics of Arbitrators, at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/milan.
chamber.of.commerce.intemational.arbitration.rules.2004/al (last visited June 29,
2005); Singapore International Arbitration Centre, Code of Practice: Code of
Ethics for an Arbitrator, at http://www.siac.org.sg/codeofethics.htm (last visited
June 30, 2005).
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arbitration practices.82 At about the same time, what had been a
predominantly domestic AAA/ABA Code of Ethics was revamped to
take account of significant changes in international practice, such as
increased concern about pre-selection disclosure requirements and
the declining acceptability of contacts between parties and party-
appointed arbitrators.83
Despite its name, the IBA cannot accurately be understood as a
supranational regulatory authority like the American Bar Association
because it does not license members and it cannot impose any
penalties for noncompliance.84 Moreover, while structured as a
"Code" and referring to "Rules," the Introductory Note of the IBA
Code states that they are not meant to operate as "rigid rules," but
instead as articulations of "the manner in which the abstract qualities
(such as impartiality, independence, competence, diligence, and
discretion) should be assessed in practice. '85 As such, the "rules" in
the IBA Code might be better understood as a statement of
"professional culture,"86 even if the IBA Code's rules regarding
disclosure brought a level of clarity far superior to the vague,
qualitative standards contained in most arbitral rules.87
Conspicuously absent from these attempts to formalize ethical
obligations are the premier, historically central institutions, such as
the ICC, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, and the London
82. The open-textured nature of the original IBA Code's provisions,
particularly with regard to what constituted an impermissible conflict for
arbitrators, had proven to be somewhat problematic. They enabled recalcitrant
parties to delay commencement of arbitral procedures with overly aggressive
challenges, while simultaneously failing to given adequate guidance for uniform
application by courts. International Bar Association, IBA Develops New Arbitrator
Guidelines, DIsP. RESOL. J., Feb.-Apr. 2004, at 7.
83. See Rogers, Developing Standards of Conduct, supra note 6, at 111-12.
84. See Daly, supra note 79, at 1158-59.
85. Carter, supra note 79, at 584.
86. This same observation has been made about the IBA's "Code" for
attorneys. See Daly, supra note 79, at 1159 (referring to the Code as a statement of
"professional culture").
87. See International Bar Association, supra note 82 (noting that the new IBA
Arbitrator Guidelines would improve upon arbitral rules defining obligations to
disclose and the nature of conflicts of interest in vague qualitative terms that left
tremendous discretion to arbitrators).
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Court of International Arbitration. None of these institutions have
adopted formal codes, nor taken steps to make their processes for
reviewing arbitrator challenges more formal or transparent.88
Notwithstanding the development of ethical codes, the most
significant control function is exercised by arbitral institutions as part
of the selection and challenge process.89 The rules that apply during
these processes, however, are vague qualitative standards that
provide little guidance, and the specifics of institutional decision-
making applying these standards are secreted away, even as against
the parties.9" Moreover, only a few institutions have published
policies of sanctioning arbitrators who digress from their
professional obligations.91 There are a few exceptions to this general
state of affairs, which I take up in Part 111.92
E. CONCLUSION
International arbitrators' efforts to claim the mantle of a profession
demonstrates an internal desire to operate and be recognized as a
coherent group entitled to certain privileges normally associated with
professions. Mixed in with this evidence of professional impulse are
some pragmatic benefits for the system, which some might argue
justifies a degree of professional autonomy. But neither the
sociological description nor the pragmatic objectives provide a
88. See ICC ARBITRATION, supra note 37, § 13.03, at 212 (observing that it is
best to challenge as infrequently as possible, following the maxim "better the devil
you know than the one you don't"); see, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, GUIDE TO ICC ARBITRATION 35 (1994) ("The Court's decisions on
[arbitrator challenges] are final and the reasons for the Court's decisions are not
communicated.").
89. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 49.
91. Both the AAA and the CNIAM have a stated policy of refusing future
appointments to arbitrators who are found to have violated their ethical codes. See
AAA, Failure to Disclose, supra note 45; see also Chamber of National and
International Arbitration of Milan, Code of Ethics of Arbitrators, art. 13, available
through http://www.cameraarbitrale.it (last visited Aug. 20, 2005). Other arbitral
institutions may limit future appointments as an informal and covert sanction, but
informal regulation based on vague and unarticulated standards may do more harm
than good for the legitimacy of international arbitration.
92. See infra notes 188-192.
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normative justification for international arbitrators' claim to special
status. In the absence of normative justification, assertions of
profession-hood may be regarded, as Ronald Rotunda and Richard
Abel have argued, as simply a rationalization for anti-competitive
behavior that would otherwise not be tolerable.93 Moreover,
professional claims that operate as nothing more than apologetics
may provoke, as occurred with the U.S. legal profession, critical
reaction or efforts to assert more direct control.94
Apart from how arbitrators perceive or present themselves, there
are separate questions of whether the institutions that support the
international arbitration system will or should expect that arbitrators
perform professional obligations that exceed the simple boundaries
of the obligations created by the contractual relationships through
which they come to serve as arbitrators. Analysis of these issues
requires first an account of the function of the international arbitrator
and an investigation into the public realm of international arbitration.
II. THE NORMATIVE UNDERPINNINGS OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATORS' VOCATION
International arbitrators have until now acted as a relatively
autonomous and informally self-regulating group, even if current
regulation remains somewhat fragmented and, as I describe in Part
III, efforts to impose external regulation are mounting. While
traditional conceptions of the profession provide little guidance for
future efforts either at self-regulation or external intervention, a clear
understanding of the vocation of the international arbitrator can have
implications for both. To that end, in this Part, I engage in a
conceptual analysis of the work of international arbitrators. I argue in
Section A that the product of international arbitrators' work is
justice, and it is this aspect of their work that distinguishes them
from other legal service providers. In Section B, I take up more
generally the public realm of the international arbitration system, in
which the justice function that distinguishes international arbitrators
is manifest.
93. See Rotunda, supra note 14, at 706.
94. See ABEL, supra note 8, at 17 ("The reduction of sociological analysis to
little more than professional apologetics eventually stimulated a critical reaction.").
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A. JUSTICE AND THE PRIVATE ARBITRATOR
One of the principle objections to private forms of dispute
resolution, most specifically settlement and mediated settlement, is
that they "almost never satisfy [the] principle of justice."9 This
objection can seem puzzling since we often refer to settlements as
"fair" and "just," and we might even speculate that in the aggregate
parties are more satisfied with settlement outcomes than the
outcomes of litigation or modern international arbitration.96 In this
section, I seek to explain first why the final end product of
international arbitration is justice as opposed simply to dispute
resolution, 97 and consequently why the vocation of the international
arbitrator is normatively distinguishable from other private legal
service providers (i.e., lawyers). 98
95. Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 SOC. PHIL. &
POL'Y 102, 104 (1986); see also Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
1073, 1075 (1984) (postulating that settlement is not, in a generic or general sense,
preferable to judgment).
96. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses
of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 502 (1985)
(arguing that critics of settlement fail to address "the most effective argument" in
favor of settlements, namely that "[i]f the parties make their own agreement they
are more likely to abide by it, and it will have greater legitimacy than a solution
imposed from without"); Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement
in an Adversary System, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 50 (1992) ("[I]f willing litigants who
would lose at trial perceive settlement as more just or fair, their tendency to
comply with settlements might be greater than their tendency to comply with
litigated judgments.").
97. In claiming that the product of international arbitral decision-making is
justice, I am not arguing against those who posit that domestic arbitration
procedures can be "unjust" because they fail to provide adequate procedural
safeguards for vulnerable individuals whose original consent to arbitration may be
dubious. See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial,
Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1997);
Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62
TUL. L. REV. 1, 54 (1987). Moreover, I am arguing not that one or all of
international arbitration's procedures ensure just results, but that the specific aim
of arbitration as a process is justice.
98. My purpose in this Essay is obviously not to explicate a comprehensive
jurisprudential theory of arbitral adjudication. I seek only to provide sufficient
criteria to understand the nature of the international arbitrator's vocation and to
explore what expectations might bare on their comportment based on that vocation.
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When the various forms of dispute resolution are classified,
arbitration is usually grouped with settlement as an "alternative" to
judicial adjudication. The primary basis for this distinction is that
both settlement and arbitration, as well as mediation and other forms
of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"), exist only as a
consequence of party consent,99 whereas judicial adjudication is
predicated on the coercive power of the state.100 Coercive power,
however, is not an essential feature of justice, even if the justice of
an outcome is relied on in part to legitimate its exercise of coercive
power.101 As such, the relationship between coercive power and the
jurisdictional origins of various dispute resolution forms does little to
explain the distinctive natures of their final products.
A better approach for conceptually analyzing their final products
is to consider how each mechanism generates its final product. A
settlement agreement is crafted and consented to after parties assess
the political and practical realities they would face in pursuing their
claims through adjudication.0 2 A settlement is produced, in other
words, through agreed compromise based on self-interested
99. See Kevin C. McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity
of Adjudication on Litigating Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV. 833, 846 (1990)
("[S]ettlement derives its authority from the consent of the parties."); MEDIATING
LEGAL DISPUTES § 14.3.4, at 402 (Dwight Golann ed., 1996) ("[M]ediation is by
definition a consensual process."); Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology and the
Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 345 (1989) ("Arbitration ...
normally requires the advance consent of the parties, usually by contract.").
100. See Jeffery R. Seul, Settling Significant Cases, 79 WASH. L. REV. 881, 932
(2004). (distinguishing public litigation as based on the coercive power of the
state); Richard Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 958 (2000)
(arguing that there is a scale on which dispute resolution procedures are situated
closer or further away from coercive governmental power).
101. Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinancy, Objectivity and Authority,
142 U. PENN. L. REV. 549 (1993).
102. As Coleman & Silver explain:
Settlement is a contractual exchange. Parties settle because they expect
settlements to make them better off than they would be if they continued to
litigate. A plaintiff may prefer settling at a particular price now to the risk of
losing at trail or to the prospect of waiting years to recover. A defendant may
want to avoid the risk of liability or to be free of the burdens of litigation.
Coleman & Silver, supra note 95, at 106.
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evaluations by the parties and it occurs irrespective of what the
outcome would be or should be through formal adjudication.° 3
By contrast, modem international arbitration outcomes are like
judicial outcomes in that they are produced by an objective tribunal's
reasoned application of established rules to facts.'01 By requiring that
the outcome of their dispute be warranted by reasons provided in a
given set of rules, parties in international arbitration have created the
possibility of objectively evaluating the quality of those outcomes.105
In other words, determining what result a given rule requires in
relation to a particular factual situation is in some sense independent
of what an individual adjudicator subjectively believes it to be.10 6 As
a consequence, the commitment to determining the appropriate
103. See id. at 106-07. In arguing that settlement does not aim to provide justice,
I do not mean to discount the importance of settlement. Many salutary benefits
flow from settlement such that it can rightly be considered an integral and
necessary part of virtually all systems. While settlement and mediation do not aim
to provide legal justice, they clearly provide "justice" as that term is used in the
popular vernacular. In fact, it may well be that on average, more parties regard
settlement agreements as providing "just" or fair outcomes than they would have
received after a full adjudication. See Bundy, supra note 96, at 50. Justice or
fairness in this colloquial sense results because an individual party calculates that
the terms of the settlement will maximize its own interests, and those terms
correspond with a similar calculation made by the opposing party based on
opposing interests. In this sense, settlement can be regarded as a mutual decision to
pursue the efficient solution.
104. I refer to established rules instead of "law" for the obvious reason that
parties may choose to be governed by a set of rules that do not meet the necessary
conditions to be considered law.
105. See Coleman & Leiter, supra note 101, at 588. Some proceduralists argue
that party participation is what makes the product of an adjudicatory process just.
This account fails to provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing settlement or
mediation, where parties enjoy more direct participation and control than in
adjudicatory processes, even though the final agreement is by definition a political
or pragmatic, not a justice-based, resolution. See Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair
Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83
B.U. L. REv. 485, 510 (2003) ("The reason we have a system of adjudication is to
decide cases and produce good outcomes. The idea is not to provide people with a
chance to participate or to give them another opportunity in their lives to exercise
autonomous choice."). Even if not the definitive criteria, procedures can obviously
affect the perceived fairness of adjudication, and hence the legitimacy of its
outcomes.
106. See Coleman & Leiter, supra note 101, at 599.
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outcome necessitates some degree of adjudicator objectivity or
impartiality. 107
While impartiality is a critical feature of the international
arbitrator's function, it would be misleadingly simplistic to say that
all adjudicators do is impartially investigate and apply the
requirements of the applicable rules. Any set of rules is necessarily
characterized by some degree of indeterminacy,10 8 which means that
to perform their task of applying governing rules to the facts, judges
and international arbitrators must exercise some degree of
discretion. 1 9 Because the outcome must be justified by the applicable
rules, however, adjudicators' discretion is a bounded discretion.1 10 At
this point it is important to note that not all types of boundaries are
created equal. If the set of rules selected by the parties is too
immature or underdeveloped, such that there is a shortage of rules to
address a significant range of situations, it might be indeterminate in
important ways that would leave international arbitrators' discretion
107. See John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 280-90 (1987); Coleman & Leiter, supra note 101, at 599-600
& n.85 ("[A] procedure for reaching decisions is objective by virtue of its relative
freedom from partiality to one side or the other").
108. There exists considerable debate about the degree of indeterminancy that
exists in the law. On the one hand, proponents of the Critical Legal Studies school
contend that all law is largely if not completely indeterminate. For one of the
founding texts of the CLS movement, see ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND
POLITICS (1975). Others, most notably Ronald Dworkin, deny indeterminacy in the
law, claiming that there are right answers to all legal disputes. Ronald Dworkin,
Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1976); see also Coleman & Leiter, supra
note 101, at 634 (arguing that Dworkin's commitment to determinacy may have
softened in recent years). While I reject strong-form conceptions of either
indeterminacy and determinacy, it is not necessary for my more modest purposes
here to give a precise account of the nature of indeterminacy implicated in the
international arbitration context, though it seems clear that the international
arbitration system is able to guarantee on average less determinacy than more
mature legal systems.
109. See Coleman & Leiter, supra note 101, at 565 (explaining the positivists'
position that when judges are faced with the penumbra of general legal terms, "a
judge has no option but to help fix the meaning through the exercise of a
discretionary authority") (citing H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law
and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607-15 (1958)).
110. While there is complex debate surrounding questions about the nature of
objectivity and the nature and extent to which judicial decision-making is bounded,
I do not take up the details of those debates here.
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effectively unbounded.Ill In that event, even if an impartial arbitrator
were appointed, the actual decision would more resemble a
settlement in which the unbounded discretion of a neutral is
substituted for the self-interest of the individual parties. Since such
an outcome could not be evaluated against an external, objective set
of rules, it could not be said to be justified in the same way that the
product of bounded discretion could be.' 12 To sum up, then, in
contrast to settlement's consensual compromise premised on
subjective self-interest, modern international arbitration requires the
objective application of rules to facts and the exercise of bounded
discretion to ensure that the final outcome is warranted by the
applicable rules; that is, to ensure that the final outcome is justified.
With this explanation of international arbitration's justice-
producing function, we can now consider what normatively
differentiates the international arbitrator's work from other legal
service providers. A good place to start is with those who assume
that in fact they are not distinguishable in any important respect.
International arbitrators are sometimes characterized as essentially
retained representatives of the parties, distinguishable from attorneys
only because they are retained collectively by all the opposing parties
111. See Coleman & Leiter, supra note 101, at 575. This problem might actually
characterize early international arbitration, in which arbitrators functioned more to
impose an equitable compromise solution than apply the selected law. See Rogers,
Developing Standards of Conduct, supra note 6, at 66.
112. If a body of applicable rules is significantly indeterminate, it does not
follow that it cannot provide any guidance in resolving a given dispute.
Indeterminacy only means that decision-maker discretion will operate more
forcefully in reaching the final decision, but it is not a basis for disregarding the
law selected by the parties, as some highly controversial decisions have done. See
FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 1512 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL COMMERICAL ARBITRATION] (describing cases involving Abu
Dhabi, Saudi Arabia and Egypt in which arbitrators either disregarded or
supplemented the chosen law on the grounds that it was not sufficiently
developed). It is in part these cases that generated a suspicion of international
arbitration in developing countries. See E1-Kosheri, supra note 24, at 47-48
(discussing the transformation of the Arab attitudes toward transnational
arbitration); Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for
Reassessing Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 419
(2000) (discussing third world concerns that international arbitration has tended to
resolve disputes in favor of the economic interests of the north).
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instead of by an individual party.113 Under this conception, the
arbitrator's vocation would be delimited to providing those services
specified in the parties' contract'1 4 and the legitimacy of outcomes
could only be measured by the extent to which the arbitrator satisfies
the parties' collective interests." 5
Intuitively, this account seems incomplete. It cannot account for
why, in our discourse, we would describe a decision that ignores
otherwise applicable mandatory law as "unjust," even if it were
satisfactory to the parties, while we would regard as "just" an award
that reaches outside the narrow confines of the parties' collective
self-interests to apply mandatory law or to invalidate a contract as
against public policy, even if it were displeasing to the parties. The
reason is that when parties agree generally that the justification of the
113. This is the implication of Andrew Guzman's conceptualization of the
arbitrator. Guzman conceives of the contract between the parties and the arbitrator
as an agreement to exchange the arbitrator's dispute resolution services for private
gain for the arbitrators. See Andrew Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling
Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DuKE L.J. 1279, 1316-24 (2000). To be fair,
Guzman is addressing the issue in the context of domestic arbitration, where
arbitration practice is significantly different in ways that may alter this analysis.
114. Guzman's commitment to arbitrators' role being solely a function of
contract is revealed in his proposed mechanism for ensuring application of
mandatory law-implication of a mandatory contract term, for which parties can
sue in case of breach. Guzman also relies on the existence of a contractual
relationship to differentiate arbitrators from judges. It is worth noting here Bradley
Wendel's thoughtful work in the area of attorney professionalism, in which he
persuasively argues that attorneys should adopt an interpretive stance toward law
in which they "respect the achievement of law" as oppsed to simply contorting it to
suit their client's interest. W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation,
99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1167, 1168-69 (2005).
115. Even if I believe the foregoing is sufficient to understand the fundamental
reasons why the international arbitrators' vocation can be understood as provider
of justice, the practice of international arbitration nevertheless raises numerous
questions that I have not answered, and will not be able to in the space of this
Essay. For example, parties select applicable law and parties can still (even if they
rarely do) empower the arbitrators to decide according to equitable, not established
legal, principles. Moreover, even when arbitration is subject to established bodies
of rules, those rules are necessarily subject to significantly greater indeterminacy in
the international arbitration context than in domestic judicial settings and
international arbitral awards are generally issued with articulated reasons, but they
need not be. The issues raised by these variations, and innumerable others,
highlight that my attempt to reconceptualize the vocation of international
arbitrators is necessarily provisional.
990 [20:957
2005] THE VOCATION OF THE INTERNA TIONAL ARBITRATOR 991
award is to be measured by the extent to which the outcome is
warranted by reasons provided by a given set of rules, the
requirements of those rules are independent of the parties' more
narrow subjective desires. Since the justice of the final award is
measured by the extent to which it is warranted by reasons that
derive from rules selected by the parties, deviations to satisfy parties'
narrower collective interests are justified.
This analysis assumes that parties are agreeing to submit disputes
to resolution in accordance with rules that require arbitrators to
subvert parties' subjective interests. This assumption is consistent
with modem international arbitration, in which parties generally
select established national law"6 and, as I examine in more detail in
the next section, invoke the relatively established rules and
procedures that are part of international arbitration's public realm.
Parties could opt out of these constraints, for example, by
designating the open-textured decisionary principles used in
international arbitration of yesteryear," 7  or by avoiding the
decisional baggage that is part of the institutional arbitration system
in favor of disengaged ad hoc procedures.II 8 But the modem reality is
that parties do not. They want law-bound decisions embedded in the
reliable constraints of the established international arbitration
system. 19 They want, in other words, the outcomes of their disputes
116. Whereas in earlier years, parties would authorize international arbitrators to
apply vague, compromise-oriented principles, today parties virtually always reject
these vaguer doctrines in favor of national law. See Rogers, Developing Standards
of Conduct, supra note 6, at 66-67.
117. See S. I. Strong, Intervention and Joinder as of Right in International
Arbitration: An Infringement of Individual Contract Rights or a Proper Equitable
Measure?, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 915, 933 (1998) (describing earlier arbitral
procedures and doctrines that entrusted significant equitable powers to arbitrators).
118. If these conditions were met, the final product of the process could
probably not rightly be considered "justice," but simply dispute resolution,
distinguishable from settlement only because the arbitrator's discretion was
substituted for the subjective will of the parties.
119. See Detlev Vagts & W. Michael Reisman, International Chamber of
Commerce Arbitration, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 268 (1986) (suggesting that ad hoc
arbitration has declined in popularity because parties have traded off the
"maximum suppleness" offered by ad hoc arbitration for the predictability of
institutionalized arbitration).
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to be warranted by reasons, apparently even if that means subverting
other interests, such as a desire to escape certain mandatory laws.
2 0
B. THE PUBLIC SIDE OF "PRIVATE" INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
International arbitration is often assigned to the "private" side of
that invisible-and some might say dubious--divide between public
and private international law. 2' Even those who doubt the efficacy of
the overarching distinction may nevertheless have reason to regard
international arbitration as predominantly a private affair.
International arbitration, which often goes under the moniker
"international commercial arbitration," usually involves private
parties who create arbitral jurisdiction through private agreement.12
The actual proceedings are usually held in "private," and arbitral
decisions, which are usually maintained as confidential, are generally
regarded as affecting only the specific parties involved and not any
future cases or the public at large. 123 Moreover, international
arbitrators resolve matters involving primarily contract-based
disputes, as opposed to matters of traditionally "public" concern.
24
As with other stark dichotomies, however, this public-private
distinction tends to rely on rudimentary dissimilarities that preclude
more nuanced appreciation of the true nature of either aspect, let
120. This analysis obviously does not mean that it is impossible for arbitrators to
operate essentially as representatives of the parties' collective interests. Instead, I
am positing the more modest thesis that generally in international arbitration, that
is not the case.
121. See Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The
Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209 (2002).
122. See Cindy G. Buys, The Tensions Between Confidentiality and
Transparency in International Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 121, 121-22
(2003).
123. See Clyde C. Pearce & Jack Coe, Jr., Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter
Eleven: Some Pragmatic Reflections Upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico, 23
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 311, 340 & n.99 (2000) ("Awards bind only the
disputing parties.").
124. The New York Convention applies to "commercial" disputes. 9 U.S.C. §
202 (2000) ("An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial,
including a transaction, contract, or agreement ... falls under the Convention.")
(emphasis added). However, the definition of "commercial" is extremely broad.
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alone their overlap, cross-referencing, and blurring at the margins. 25
As has been previously observed, "it is difficult to untangle private
litigation from the public's business, 1 26 so not surprisingly in the
context of international arbitration, there remains an unmistakably
vibrant "public realm." 127
To date, the modest efforts to explore the "public" side of
arbitration have concentrated on the domestic U.S. context and have
focused almost exclusively on the question of whether arbitration
implicates state action such that it is subject to U.S. constitutional
procedural protections. 28 There are, however, numerous other ways
in which so-called "private" international arbitration implicates the
125. See Dinesh D. Banani, International Arbitration and Project Finance in
Developink Countries: Blurring the Public/Private Distinction, 26 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 355 (2003); Derek W. Bowett, Claims Between States and Private
Entities: The Twili-aht Zone of International Law, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 929, 933
(1986) (describing the interplay of public and private sources of law and legal
methodologies in disputes involving both state and private entities).
126. Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring? The Market in Tort Claims
Has Arrived, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 859, 962. Scales is not specifically referring to
arbitration, but his insight nevertheless applies.
127. See Buys, supra note 122, at 135 ("While in most instances, international
commercial arbitration probably does not impact large segments of civil society..
., the general public may still be affected in a variety of ways."); see also
Carbonneau, supra note 17, at 774 ("Despite its service to the wealth-creating
ambition of the international business community, ICA represents an idealistic
experiment in transborder understanding and cooperation.").
128. The most extensive and forceful of these investigations has been
undertaken by Richard Reuben and Jean Sternlight. See Richard C. Reuben, Public
Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL.
L. REv. 577 (1997); Reuben, supra note 100, at 1047-50 (asserting that private
arbitration invariably incorporates a constitutional dimension); Sternlight, supra
note 97, at 1 (arguing that mandatory arbitration involves state action, but may
deprive individuals of certain constitutional rights); see also Sarah Rudolph Cole
& E. Gary Spitko, Arbitration and the Batson Principle, 38 GA. L. REv. 1145,
1178-97 (2004) (concluding that state action is not present when a private litigant
exercises a peremptory challenge in an arbitral proceeding); Kenneth R. Davis,
Due Process Right to Judicial Review of Arbitral Punitive Damages Awards, 32
AM. Bus. L.J. 583, 601-16 (1995) (exploring the rationale used by some courts to
analyze whether state action is present in arbitration); Stephen J. Ware, Punitive
Damages in Arbitration: Contracting Out of Government's Role in Punishment
and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 529, 559-67 (1994)
(finding that there is no state action in arbitral awards that provide for punitive
damages).
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"public realm." These public facets have affected and should affect
conceptions of the international arbitrator's vocation.
1. Public Law Claims in International Arbitration
One of the significant distinctions between modem international
arbitration and early-modem arbitration up through the 1970s is that
the modem version is characterized by the application of law to a
given dispute. While generally orbiting around an underlying
contractual arrangement, international arbitration disputes also often
involve claims based on public and mandatory law, such as antitrust,
securities fraud, and intellectual property, 129 as well as certain
mandatory contract law rules that reflect commitments to public
interests.130 These claims are unmistakably imbued with a "public"
129. It was because of their social value that most public law claims, such as
patent, antitrust and securities, had previously been considered non-arbitrable. See
Julia A. Martin, Note, Arbitrating in the Alps Rather Than Litigating in Los
Angeles: The Advantages of International Intellectual Property-Specific
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 49 STAN. L. REv. 917, 937 (1997); see also Leo
Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration
Experience, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 239, 255 (1987) ("Despite its perceived
shortcomings, arbitration is capable of serving many important interests, both
public and private."). In civil law countries, there remains significant resistance to
entrusting mandatory law claims to arbitral processes. See Philip J.
McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A "Second Look" at
International Commercial Arbitration, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 474-75 (1999)
(arguing that the "inarbitrabilitv of mandatory law claims traditionally was, and
still is in most countries, a fundamental premise of international arbitration").
130. Either to protect the parties to the contract or other third parties who may
be affected, certain contract rules are crafted as immutable, mandatory rules. See
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertnert, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (recognizing the duty to act in
good faith is an "immutable" rule); Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Contract
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 611 (2003) (discussing
the mandatory rule that parties cannot agree to prevent modification of their
contracts in the future); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 96, at 500-01 (arguing that it
can be hard to distinguish "private" from "public" oriented disputes). I do not and
need not contend that international arbitration affords the same potency to the
private attorney general as our clandestine warrior would have in a U.S. court in a
purely domestic case.
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essence in that, to co-opt Owen Fiss's words, adjudicating them
helps us "give our society an identity and inner coherence."131
Not only does international arbitration incidentally encounter these
socially important claims, it adjudicates claims involving
transnational applications of mandatory law more often, 132 and
arguably more effectively, than domestic national courts. National
courts must fight competing claims to prescriptive and judicial
jurisdiction, and their judgments face significant obstacles to
enforcement abroad.'33 As a consequence, one nation's assertion that
a particular law is mandatory does not necessarily make it
inescapable if another nation adjudicates the case or refuses to
enforce the judgment. 34 In contrast to the hurdles facing
131. Here I quote Owen Fiss somewhat ironically because he argues that public
values should be expressed only through public adjudication. While his most
vehement charges are laid against settlement, he also objects to arbitration and
mediation. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms
of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1979). Fiss is also referring most specifically to
what might be considered "core" public claims, such as claims of equality and
liberty. While I don't claim that international arbitration ever or even occasionally
implicates these values that Fiss is most concerned with, I do maintain that the
public mandatory law claims presented in international arbitration present
important, even if not core, matters of public concern. There are some who agree
that international arbitrator implicates public interests, but are not always effective
at serving them. See, e.g., Wai, supra note 121, at 263 ("State-based private law
often includes protection of third parties and social interests among its substantive
objectives, but there may be a tendency for private adjudicators to ignore
arguments about the protection of individuals and groups not party to the actual
decision in their interpretation of these laws.").
132. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age:
Public Interests in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT'L L.
219, 262 (2001) (noting that nearly all of antitrust enforcement is through private
litigation and arbitration); see also BERGER, supra note 5, at 8 n.62 (citing VAN DEN
BERG ET AL., supra note 5, at 134. Notably, the consignment of public law claims
to private litigation is a uniquely American phenomenon, which might make this
statement less true (or at least applicable to a narrower range of cases) as applied to
other countries.
133. Gary Born refers to these problems collectively as "the peculiar
uncertainties of transnational litigation." GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2 (2d ed. 2001).
134. See John R. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The
Need for Enhanced Accommodations of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L.
REV. 219, 224 (1986). This argument has also been advanced by some
commentators, who point out that expert arbitrators may be substantively superior
996 AM. U. INT' L. REV. [20:957
transnational litigation, anecdotal evidence suggests that
international arbitration is doing a reasonably robust job of
enforcement in individual cases.'35 Far from completely undermining
the public concerns embodied in mandatory rules, international
arbitration is capable of ensuring, and at least to some discernable
extent does ensure, their vitality.13 6
to lay juries. See Gruner, supra note 40, at 944. Still, there remain detractors who
contend that arbitation downplays public interests because "[tlhe goal of arbitrators
is to resolve the dispute presented in a manner responsive to the interests of the
parties. Unlike judges, arbitrators need not, and generally should not, consider
broader public interests as well." Buxbaum, supra note 132, at 245. But see
McConnaughav, supra note 129, at 456 (arguing that international arbitral awards
"are far less likely than public judicial decisions to effectuate the purposes of the
mandatory laws").
135. In contrast to the legendary problems faced in attempts to enforce U.S.
antitrust judgments abroad, in its amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to permit
the arbitration of antitrust claims in Mitsubishi v. Soler, the ICC provided
numerous examples of cases administered under the auspices of the ICC in which
various national competition laws were "adeptly handled" and the public policy
interests of the relevant countries were taken into account. Amicus Curie Brief of
International Chamber of Commerce at 4-5, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (Nos. 83-1569, 83-1733). For
example, international arbitration may be better at preserving the immutable rule of
good faith than U.S. courts have been. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism,
Party Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1223, 1247-57 (1999)
(criticizing the trend in U.S. courts to transform the mandatory rule of good faith
into a default rule that the parties can modify). But see Gruner, supra note 40, at
945 (speculating that "public claims are still relatively rarely arbitrated
internationally").
136. When speaking about an international context, such as international
arbitration, there is an inherent ambiguity in the terms "public" and "public realm."
On the one hand, there are national public constituencies that count on domestic
mandatory laws to be given expression through international arbitration, which
perhaps most closely corresponds to what Fiss refers to when he uses the term
"public values." However, there is a sense in which international arbitration
intentionally subverts national conceptions of "the public" to an international
conception of "the public." This distinction is borne out in the significant debate
over whether the public policy exception in Article V of the New York Convention
refers to domestic or international public policy. See Pierre Lalive, Transnational
(or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration, in
COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION 257,
260-69 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1987). In the context of my argument, the distinction
between a national and an international public raises obviously important questions
about the nature of community and its relation to the "public realm," as well as
questions about the precise meaning of the "public realm" in the international
context. Notwithstanding the importance of these questions, I leave them for future
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Skeptics of private arbitration may be unimpressed by evidence
that arbitrators are generally willing to enforce the mandatory rules
encompassed in law selected by the parties. 3 ' The real problem with
arbitration, they might argue, is that international arbitration allows
parties to contractually circumvent the mandatory law of one nation
by choosing the law of another. Certainly, it is true that parties, for
both legitimate and illegitimate reasons, intentionally seek to avoid
mandatory national laws.13s But it is also true that international
arbitration does not provide a complete escape. 13 9
Arbitrators have developed a range of what might be considered
specialized arbitral conflict of law rules to justify applying "foreign"
consideration as time and space limitations preclude me from addressing them in
the context of this Essay.
137. Notwithstanding some skepticism expressed at a theoretical level, it is
generally understood in the arbitration community that arbitrators have an
obligation to apply the mandatory rules of the governing law chosen by the parties.
See Eric A. Posner, Arbitration and the Harmonization of International
Commercial Law: A Defense of Mitsubishi, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 647, 668 (1999)
("The evidence suggests that international arbitrators are deeply concerned about
their reputation for respecting mandatory rules."); see also INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 112, 1517. The same is not necessarily
true in U.S. domestic arbitration. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from
Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703,
720-21 (1999) (noting how "rtlhe widespread belief among ru.S. domestici
arbitrators that they are under no duty to apply the law is consistent with standard
expectations about arbitration" that many parties choose arbitration because it
provides a less legalistic process than litigation).
138. For example, a foreign investor might seek to avoid the instability of the
host country's law, particularly the possibility of nationalization of its investment.
Avoidance can also occur unintentionally when one country's law is selected
before the parties know what categories of "foreign" mandatory claims may later
arise. See Mohammad Reza Baniassadi, Do Mandatory Rules of Public Law Limit
Choice of Law in International Commercial Arbitration?, 10 INT'L TAX & Bus.
LAW. 59, 74-75 (1992) ("[P]arties specifically exclude the application of
mandatory rules of public law of the place of performance of the contract by an
exclusive choice of law clause.").
139. An interesting question, which would be virtually impossible to test
empirically, is whether international arbitration is more successful at enforcing
mandatory law claims than national litigation-with all its jurisdictional and
procedural limitations-would be. The prevailing assumption, at least in
jurisdictions that willingly submit mandatory law claims to arbitration, is
presumably "yes" or at least "probably."
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mandatory law 40 or limit parties' ability to avoid mandatory law. For
example, to protect the integrity of their own work product,
arbitrators can, and often do, apply foreign mandatory law if failure
to acknowledge it could interfere with the enforceability of the final
award.14" ' There are also other, less widely accepted theories under
which international arbitrators have supplemented or disregarded
parties' choice of law, most notably when foreign mandatory law
would have affected performance of the contract had the parties not
contracted around it. Finally, one of the most important and accepted
bases for avoiding parties' choice of law is that application of it
would violate public policy. According to most arbitration experts,
"[t]here is no doubt that arbitrators are entitled to disregard the
provisions of governing law chosen by the parties where they
consider provisions to be contrary to international public policy."'4
This rule is applied with some degree of regularity to void contracts
for bribery, even if bribery would not invalidate the contract under
the law chosen by the parties and the issue of bribery was not raised
by either party.'43 These doctrines and rules provide a meaningful,
140. "Foreign mandatory law" refers to mandatory law of a jurisdiction other
than that selected by the parties. See Daniel Hochstrasser, Choice of Law and
"Foreign " Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration, 11 J. INT'L ARB. 57, 81
(1994).
141. See Homayoon Arfazadeh, In the Shadow of the Unruly Horse:
International Arbitration and the Public Policy Exception, 13 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 43, 59 ("In practice ... international arbitrators often feel constrained to
apply the domestic public policy rule of the country whose courts can effectively
review, quash and vacate the final award under the 'second look' doctrine,
regardless of its 'application worthiness."'); Yves Derains, Public Policy and the
Law Applicable to the Dispute in International Arbitration, in COMPARATIVE
ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION 227, 255 (Pieter
Sanders ed., 1987) (suggesting that arbitrators must keep an eye toward the
mandatory law of the like enforcement jurisdiction or jurisdictions to ensure that
their award is enforceable); William W. Park, National Law and Commercial
Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L.
REV. 647, 649 (1989) (same).
142. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 112, 1533
(noting that even those commentators who argue for strict autonomy acknowledge
the importance of this principle).
143. In the first case that portended this rule, ICC Award No. 1110, 24 (1963),
the tribunal refused to adjudicate the case in which a British company agree to pay
bribes to an Argentinean intermediary. The tribunal concluded that it had no
arbitral jurisdiction. Id; see also INTERNATIONAL COMMERICAL ARBITRATION,
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even if not impermeable, bulwark against erosion of the public realm
in international arbitration.
2. Public Goods Generated by International Arbitration
In addition to creating space for enforcement of national
mandatory law, international arbitration also generates several
"public goods"" that are unmistakably part of its public realm.
These goods come in the form of rule-making, which provides
guidance to future parties and arbitrator tribunals, and in the
development of a uniquely skilled group of individuals who are
capable of confronting the complexities of a transnational system of
justice.
Even in the absence of a formal system of stare decisis, 45 and
despite the confidential and "private" nature of international
arbitration, arbitration proceedings generate procedural rules and
practices, and to a lesser extent substantive rules, that serve as
supra note 112, 1468 (noting the ICC's determination that "contracts which
seriously violate bonos mores ... cannot be sanctioned by courts or arbitrators").
Later tribunals have instead affirmed that they had jurisdiction over the dispute,
but ruled that a contract for bribery was void as against international public policy.
Id. at 823-24. Arbitration's enforcement of public values peaked in cases where
arbitral tribunal findings have led to criminal prosecutions for bribery that may
have otherwise gone undetected. It should be noted, however, that there have been
occasions when this approach has not been followed, such as the notorious case of
Northrop Corp. v. Triad International Marketing S.A., 811 F.2d 1265, 1270 (9th
Cir. 1987), where the tribunal held that the contract was enforceable and a U.S.
court later affirmed that finding.
144. This vein of my analysis was inspired by David Luban's thoughtful essay,
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2623 (1995).
A "public good" is a positive externality, meaning "a beneficial product that
cannot be provided to one consumer without making it available to all (or at least
many others)." Id. Jules Coleman and Charles Silver were the first to elaborate the
theory that trials produce public goods, meaning that they benefit not only the
parties but also third parties, because the opinions and precedents produced by
private adjudication are "sources of information about things that can and cannot
lawfully be done in a society." Coleman & Silver, supra note 95, at 114-15.
145. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 100 (1994) (stating that
published awards fail to "command stare decisis respect" like a court decision).
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precedent for future arbitrations and beyond. 4 6 Take, for example,
the above-described rule that allows voiding a contract for bribery as
contrary to public policy. 14 7 This rule began as a procedural rule
against the exercise of arbitral jurisdiction. The case establishing that
rule was reported, elaborated on, and then incorporated into the rich
literature regarding international arbitration procedure. Later, it was
transformed into a substantive rule for invalidating contracts, and it
thus became part of the generally accepted principles of international
arbitral decision-making, forming non-binding but highly persuasive
rules to guide future tribunals.'48 This rule and others like it are
consulted by parties in arbitration, and familiarity with them may be
146. See Buys, supra note 122, 122-23 & n.7 ("Although arbitral awards have
no precedential value, the reasoning of the arbitrators may be persuasive to other
arbitrators confronting the same or a similar issue.").
147. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. Similar evolutions have taken
place with regard to the development of established limitations on parties' ability
to agree on procedures, such as the requirement that the parties be treated equally.
ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
292-93 (2d ed. 1991).
148. See Kenneth Michael Curtin, Redefining Public Policy in International
Arbitration of Mandatory National Laws, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 271, 279 (1997)
("Publication of arbitral awards . . . is becoming more common, thus alleviating
the difficulties associated with a lack of precedent."); Klaus Peter Berger,
International Arbitration Practice and the Unidroit Principles of International
Commercial Contracts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 129, 149 (1998) (stating that "arbitral
awards more and more assume a genuine precedential value within the
international arbitration process"); William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common
Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REv. 677, 719 (2000)
("With each passing year, there is an ever-increasing volume of reported arbitral
awards (particularly in civil law jurisdictions, as well as in the United States), and
arbitrators are tending more and more to refer to previous awards rendered in
similar cases, thus gradually developing a system of arbitral precedent."); cf
Bernard H. Oxman, International Decisions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 198, 205 (2002)
(noting that with regard to non-commercial contexts "the FICJ] has invoked other
international arbitral awards.., on [some] occasions, and has even brought some
within the ambit of "precedents" that it will consider on a par with its own prior
decisions"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 103 (1986)
(noting that while adjudicative opinions are not formally treated as stare decisis
under international law, arbitral awards and other international court decisions
have been treated as highly persuasive evidence of customary international law).
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said to measure an arbitrator's professional sophistication and
competence. 149
While international arbitration's treatment of bribery may be
among the most famous lines of precedents, it is by no means the
only procedural innovation. Unusual procedural cases are often
published for the express purpose of providing guidance to future
arbitrators. One particularly important recent example is the
tribunal's decision in the infamous case of the kidnapped Indonesian
arbitrator, which will undoubtedly be important precedent in any
future case in which foul play has fallen upon a member of the
tribunal. 50 At a less dramatic and less observable level, international
arbitration has also generated its own set of hybridized evidentiary
procedures designed to bridge gaps between civil and common law
procedural traditions. 5' The evolution of these now well-settled
procedural norms occurred less through formal exchange of
published opinions than through the cross-pollenization that comes
with the overlapping experiences of those in the international
arbitration community.
149. Unlike conventional domestic arbitration, in which arbitrators are most
often industry specialists, international arbitrators, "like public court judges, tend
to be generalists in substantive legal knowledge but specialists in legal. procedure."
Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and
International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 96 (2000);
Bryant G. Garth, Diffusion and Transformation: Reflections on a Theme, 4 DISP.
RESOL. MAG. 4, 5 (1998) ("[T]he success of this transnational system of private
justice has come in part through the development of a cadre of professional
arbitrators, well-versed in arbitration techniques.").
150. One commentator rightly applauds "the extraordinary fortitude and
intellectual rigor with which the members of the Arbitral Tribunal approached their
task in this case while in a virtually constant state of siege." Marc J. Goldstein,
International Commercial Arbitration, 34 INT'L LAW. 519, 530 (2000). He further
opines that "rilntemational arbitrators and counsel for parties in such proceedings
may well refer to these awards, for generations to come, for the guidance they
provide in combating a deliberate campaign of sabotage against the arbitration
proceedings by the state party." Id.
151. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral Procedure, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1313 (2003); Lara M. Pair, Cross-Cultural Arbitration:
Do the Differences Between Cultures Still Influence International Commercial
Arbitration Despite Harmonization?, 9 ILSA J. INT'L COMP. L. 57 (2002).
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In addition to procedural precedents, certain substantive
commercial rules have developed and are used by arbitrators to
supplement national choice of law provisions:
Recent scholars have noted that certain rules of law have
taken on an international character and are being emDloved
by arbitrators when resolvine transnational disDutes. Some of
the DrinciDles uoon which international arbitrators have
remularlv relied include, inter alia. the duties to bargain in
2ood faith. to mitigate damages. and to renegotiate contracts,
as well as numerous maritime issues. 152
The complexities of rule-making for the transnational context and
international arbitrators' close and integral relationship to that
context means that they are arguably more efficient and effective at
creating certain types of transnational rules than actors in either the
national or international legislative contexts could be.153
The effect of the substantive and procedural rules produced by
international arbitrators is not limited to application through informal
precedent. 154 Many of the rules developed in the international
152. Mark Garavaglia, In Search of the Proper Law in Transnational
Commercial Disputes, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 29, 30-31 (1991). As
noted above, the substantive rule that contracts for bribery are void as against
international public policy began as a procedural rule, but evolved into a
substantive rule of contract law that supplements parties' choice of law. Some
other examples of established "arbitral law," which straddle the line between
substance and procedure, include lines of arbitral decisions that address whether
the signature on a contract of a state-owned entity is sufficient to subject the state
itself to arbitral jurisdiction, and how the scope of an arbitral clause should be
interpreted. See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 112,
508. As one eminent commentator has explained, "on reading the ICC awards and
their commentaries, one significant phenomenon becomes clear: the more recent
awards are based on earlier decisions, and the decisions reached are generally
consistent." Id. 384.
153. See Sandeep Gopalan, New Trends in the Making of International
Commercial Law, 23 J.L. & CoM. 117, 117 (2004) ("Increasingly, nation states are
becoming less important in the creation of international commercial law with the
growth of regional organizations, non-state actors, and international arbitration.
This is spurred on by the march of globalization and the need for international
commercial law.").
154. It should also be noted that apart from arbitral proceedings, the
international arbitration community affects the making of national policy,
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arbitration context have subsequently been relied on in legislative
efforts to develop rules and laws that apply both in and outside of the
international arbitration context. For example, the drafting committee
for the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International
Arbitration ("IBA Rules") essentially codified the hybridized
practices that were already in use in international arbitration.'55 These
IBA Rules can be adopted by parties to an international arbitration,
which makes them formally binding on the arbitrators who are
appointed to decide the dispute. Moreover, regardless of whether the
American Law Institute's ("ALl") current efforts at drafting
transnational rules of civil procedure took any inspiration from the
IBA Rules,'56 they nevertheless will be a yardstick against which the
products of the ALI's project will be measured.
With regard to substantive rules, international arbitration has
become a resource for national lawmaking. The commercial rules
and norms developed by international arbitrators have been restated
as lex mercatoria, and subsequently relied on, at least in part, by the
legislative efforts undertaken by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") in drafting the Principles of
International Commercial Contracts,'57 and by the drafters of the
legislation and jurisprudence through activities other than adjudication, such as
lobbying or commission reports. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 45-46.
155. As one commentator describes:
Drafted by a working party composed of arbitration specialists with civil-law
and common-law backgrounds, the IBA Rules primarily restate and
generalize practices that were already in use in international arbitration. These
practices sought to achieve compromise solutions taking into account both
common-law and civil-law approaches to evidentiary issues.
Kaufnann-Kohler, supra note 151, at 1323.
156. There are some striking similarities, particularly regarding the introduction
of evidence, between the IBA Rules and the ALI in its Principles and Rules of
Transnational Civil Procedure, even if the drafts do not explicitly acknowledge
reliance on the IBA Rules or arbitral practice. Compare Joint American Law
Institute/UNIDROIT Work Group on Principle and Rules of Transnational Civil
Procedure, Draft Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure, at 19.3
(allowing courts to accept direct witness testimony in written form), with
Intemational Bar Association, IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in
International Commercial Arbitration, art. 4(4) (granting the arbitral tribunal the
authority to obtain written "witness statements" of direct testimony).
157. See Klaus Peter Berger, The Lex Mercatoria Doctrine and the Unidroit
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
1003
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods.'58 These
legislative uses for the products of international arbitration
demonstrate the ability of "private" adjudication to engage in
meaningful rule-making, some of which ends up guiding expressly
public lawmaking and adjudication.159
To the extent that I have mapped the terrain of international
arbitration's rule-making function, its borders seem to only be
growing. Commentators, most of them well-known arbitrators,
continuously call for increased transparency through the publication
of reasoned awards and an increased reliance on precedent in arbitral
decision-making. 160  Moreover, international arbitration has
943, 947-58 (1997). Significant debate surrounds efficacy of the lex mercatoria,
and to a lesser extent the UNIDROIT Principles, in light of modem needs for the
clarity and predictability that many suppose can only come from a fully developed
national system. See Alejandro Garro, The Contribution of the UNIDROIT
Principles to the Advancement of International Commercial Arbitration, 3 TUL. J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 93, 112 (1995) (demonstrating the limitations of lex mercatoria
because it requires "a search for diffuse rules found in, among other areas, trade
usages, customs and legal scholarship"). Despite this criticism, parties select the
lex mercatoria and, in increasing numbers, the UNIDROIT Principles. Id. at 110-
13.
158. The CISG has been acceded to by the United States and thus applies as the
governing law in all contracts between Americans and citizens of other signatory
nations. Berger, supra note 157, at 943 n.120 (noting that the CISG may "be
viewed as an attempt to codify rules and principles of the lex mercatoria").
159. Importantly, these critics focus on domestic arbitration, where the
publication of precedents, and even the articulation of reasons underlying the
decisions, is rare. See Reuben, supra note 100, at 1083 ("The AAA Rules for
Commercial Arbitration, reflecting what may be viewed as the traditional approach
[in domestic arbitration], do not require arbitrators to disclose their reasoning and,
indeed, the organization in the past has expressly discouraged the practice as a
hedge against judicial review."). But see Rau, supra note 32, at 538 nn.183 & 188.
In fact, some civil law systems treat unreasoned awards as unenforceable
violations of public policy. See James T. Peter, Med-Arb in International
Arbitration, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 83, 86 & n.21 (1997).
160. See William W. Park, Private Adjudicators and the Public Interest: The
Expanding Scope of International Arbitration, 12 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 629, 630
(1986) (calling for greater transparency in the arbitral process and more uniform
rules of procedure and publication of awards as means to increase legitimacy and
lawfulness of international commerical arbitration); see also Richard M. Buxbaum,
Introduction, 4 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 205, 208 (1986); Thomas E. Carbonneau,
Arbitral Adjudication: A Comparative Assessment of Its Remedial and Substantive
Status in Transnational Commerce, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 33, 39 (1984); Julian D.M.
Lew, The Case for the Publication of Arbitration Awards, in THE ART OF
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conquered new areas as it has become incorporated into the fixed
landscape of trade-related disputes, which in turn has increased the
rate of publication of awards and accentuated public aspects of the
arbitral process.161 It produces precedents that, while not as
systematic or authoritative as a common law network of cases, guide
future parties and arbitral tribunals. These precedents increase the
degree of certainty and order in future arbitral proceedings, even if
they are not formally binding. In other words, international arbitral
decisions are not simply a method for resolving disputes, but also a
superior source of rule-making for the international arbitration
community. 62 In a meaningful sense, international arbitration
produces precedents that are public goods.
Apart from its rule-making function, international arbitration
generates other public goods that together ensure the existence and
vitality of international arbitration as an efficient and effective
mechanism for adjudicating most of the world's international
commercial and trade-related disputes. One public good international
arbitration produces is a group of highly skilled arbitrators. Just as
trials may allow lawyers to hone their advocacy skills 163 or judges to
enhance their trial management skills, 16 arbitrators can only become
ARBITRATION 226-29 (Jan C. Schultz & Albert Jan van den Berg eds., 1982);
Bernardo M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, The New Lex Mercatoria and the
Harmonization of the Laws of International Commercial Transactions, 2 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 317, 336-37 (1984) (suggesting "the formation of institutions which give
arbitrators access to prior arbitration awards and require them to follow a more or
less strict rule of stare decisis").
161. See Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on International Arbitration,
19 OHIO ST. J. DIsp. RESOL. 69, 86 (2003) ("The most important body of
international arbitration jurisprudence emanates from ... the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal. The significance of these decisions as persuasive authority is
second to none."). Alford also notes that published "NAFTA Chapter 11 awards
fare] quickly becoming an important source of international arbitration
jurisprudence." Id.
162. See Carbonneau, supra note 17, at 774 ("In a word, rinternational
commercial arbitration] has been a vital engine in the creation of a trans-border
rule of law.").
163. See McMunigal, supra note 99, at 856-61.
164. See Luban, supra note 144, at 2623-24.
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competent through experience arbitrating actual cases. 165 It is for this
reason that one of the primary inquiries parties make when selecting
an arbitrator is into the person's experience as an international
arbitrator. 66 Moreover, while there exist some established courses
for those who wish to become arbitrators, the most valuable training
is on-the-job guidance by seasoned arbitrators. 167
Perhaps the greatest public good created by individual
international arbitrations is with regard to the integrity and
legitimacy of the international arbitration system. David Luban has
argued that judicial authority can be conceptualized as a public good
that is furthered by adjudication. 16 He explains that when disputants
rely on the judgment of a court to resolve their controversies, they
"enhance the court's claim as an authoritative resolver of
controversies."' 169 Under this view, litigants are "subsidiz[ing]
judicial authority that is available for future litigants.' 70 Even if
Luban's substantive position is overtly antagonistic to arbitration,'
17
165. While experience in prior cases may be a necessary measure of
competence, it is not necessarily a sufficient one, particularly when one considers
market distortions that affect appointment. See supra notes 32-35 and
accompanying text.
166. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and
International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 96-97
(2000).
167. See Pierre A. Karrer, So You Want to Become an Arbitrator? A Roadmap
(analogizing the process of becoming an arbitrator to the process of becoming an
orchestra conductor-starting as an assistant and following in the footsteps of a
mentor), available at http://www.plplaw.ch/topic-become-arbitrator.php (last
visited Aug. 28, 2005). A similar phenomenon has evolved in domestic arbitration.
Seth E. Lipner, Report of the Shadow Arbitration Policy Task Force on Securities
Arbitration Reform, 1998 ABA SEC. SEC. LITIG. & ARB. J-69, J-75 (discussing a
proposal that "new arbitrators be required to observe at least two arbitrations
before being added to the roster of arbitrators. This 'hands-on' training, required of
mediators, will improve the performance (and consistency) of apprentice
arbitrators").
168. See Luban, supra note 144.
169. See id. at 2625.
170. See id. (explaining that authority has a "reflexive character," meaning that
increased authority inspires further use by litigants, which in turn increases the
court's authority).
171. See id. ("[W]hen litigants go elsewhere for resolution-private arbitration,
nongovernmental agencies, or private bargaining-the salience of adjudication
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it captures a more generalized insight, which can be fairly
commandeered for international arbitration. 71 Just as recurrent use of
national courts enhances judicial authority, parties consistently
resorting to international arbitration enhances the system and
reinforces its legitimacy to the point that it is considered the
uncontested preference for international parties. 73 That authority and
legitimacy, in turn, encourages parties to voluntarily comply with
arbitral awards, 74 which is an essential precondition for the effective
functioning of the system.
C. CONCLUSION
The extent of international arbitration's public realm and the
ability of international arbitrators to take cognizance of public issues
not presented by the parties should not be overstated. 75 Particularly
fades and the authority of the court weakens."). Luban also acknowledges that
adjudication is not universally viewed as a public good, or as superior to other
forms of dispute resolution. Judith Resnik is the most prominent proponent of this
view. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.
CHI. L. REv. 494, 535 (1986).
172. In reality, as explained above, international arbitration is not effectively
diverting cases from judicial adjudication, since domestic courts are largely unable
to efficiently produce judgments that can be enforced outside the United States.
REISMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 1215 ("[A]rbitral awards as a whole enjoy a
higher degree of transnational certainty than judgments of national courts.").
173. As Tom Carbonneau explains:
Because business transactions cannot take place without a functional system
of adjudication, ICA has enabled parties to engage in and pursue international
commerce. As a result, it has had an enormous impact upon the international
practice of law, the structuring of a de facto international legal system, and
the development of a substantive world law of commerce.
Carbonneau, supra note 17, at 773.
174. Although there are no reliable statistics, general consensus is that the
overwhelming majority of international arbitral awards are voluntarily complied
with. See BORN, supra note 133, at 704 ("Many international arbitral awards do not
require either judicial enforcement or confirmation, because they are voluntarily
complied with."); Elisabeth M. Senger-Weiss, EnforcingZ Foreien Arbitral Awards,
DisP. RESOL. J., Feb. 1998, at 70, 71-72 ("The majority of arbitral awards are
satisfied through the voluntary compliance of the parties involved .. ").
175. See Shalakany, supra note 112, at 443 (arguing that despite being generally
recognized as "necessary and inevitable," international arbitration is not the
"omnipotent denationalized judiciary it is fancied to be").
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in developing countries and in trade-related contexts, arbitral awards
can have significant social implications that reach far beyond the
stark confines of private commercial relationships. 176 Even under a
conceptualization of international arbitrators as justice-providers, it is
unlikely they could, under the current conceptions and institutional
structures, strive to effectuate deep structural social change. 177 Their
justice function and their contributions to a public realm, however,
do significantly raise the ante on how their work will be evaluated
both by the parties to particular cases and more generally.1
78
III. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATORS' VOCATION
The professional impulses that I describe in Part I may be
principally intended, as Weberian theories of the profession suggest,
as efforts to gain a market advantage for the international arbitrator
industry. But whatever their intended function, these inclinations
toward professionalization may also have the unintended effect of
creating certain expectations regarding the values the very term
"profession" emotes-quality control, transparency, ethical conduct,
self-regulation, and the like. If these implicit promises turn out to be
elusive, 79 international arbitrators may unwittingly be inviting
176. See Bemardo M. Cremades, Disputes Arising Out of Foreign Direct
Investment in Latin America: A New Look at the Clavo Doctrine and Other
Jurisdictional Issues, DisP. RESOL. J., May-July 2004, at 78, 84 ("The often
enormous social implications of arbitral awards, especially in the least developing
countries, require arbitrators to strictly comply with their obligations.").
177. It is this function that Owen Fiss championed as the critical role for public
courts to play. See Owen Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of
Adjudication, 6 L. & HUM. BEH. 121, 128 (1982); Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court,
1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979).
178. See Banani, supra note 125, at 363; Shalakany, supra note 112, at 424.
179. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 40; Christian Hausmaninger, Civil Liability of
Arbitrators-Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 7 J. INT'L ARB. 5
(1990). Perhaps the most aggressive and least realistic proposal comes in the
context of domestic arbitration as a means to control arbitrator decisions that
implicate mandatory law. See Guzman, supra note 113.
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external controls. 8 ° Competition to regulate arbitrators is already
emerging, although at this point predominately in the domestic
arbitration context.
Self-regulation and market-based mechanisms seem clearly
preferable to national interference, but they must be buttressed and
made more effective. In Section A below, I consider how some of the
existing efforts at self-regulation can be made more effective, while
in Section B I urge a more active role for arbitral institutions in this
process. Finally, in Section C, I consider how their vocation as
justice-providers and the increasing discernment of a public realm in
international arbitration may suggest the need to impose new, more
expressly public-oriented obligations on international arbitrators.
A. INCREASED TRANSPARENCY IN THE MARKET FOR
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SERVICES
The market for international arbitrators' services, as I describe in
Part 1,181 suffers from sometimes severe barriers to entry and
information asymmetries. The proliferation of directories and rosters
of potential international arbitrators undoubtedly have salutary side-
effects in increasing the public availability of the identity of potential
candidates. To provide a true quality control function or shed real
light on the otherwise opaque market, however, they must do
something more than simply provide access to international
arbitrators' self-crafted and self-serving profiles. Currently, none of
the information resources appears to collect, either independently or
through voluntary disclosure from participating candidates,
information about whether those arbitrators listed have ever been
challenged for bias or whether any of their awards have been refused
enforcement. In addition, these factual profiles could be
supplemented with feedback from former parties or other arbitrators
regarding their past experiences with particular candidates. While
relatively modest proposals, creating public access to such
information would go a long way toward overcoming the
180. See Barry Sullivan, Naked Fitzies and Iron Cages: Individual Values,
Professional Virtues and the Struggle for Public Space, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1687,
1702 (2004); ABEL, supra note 8, at 38.
181. See supra Part I.B.
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inadequacies of the current situation in which the most valuable
information is available only anecdotally and is not cost effective to
obtain. 112
Moreover, there are existing precedents that testify to the
feasibility of these proposals. References by former parties are
generally part of mediation practice, 83 and party feedback and public
critique is widely available for judges. 8 4 These resources are
arguably much more important for arbitrators than either for
mediators, who cannot impose binding decisions, or for judges, who
cannot be avoided if they have an undesirable track record. Providing
this source of feedback would necessarily require some degree of
editing to ensure the confidentiality of parties and to protect
arbitrators against malicious or unfounded accusations, but such
efforts would likely find ready compensation from parties who are
otherwise unable to access the information.
Perhaps even more significant than the benefit to individual
parties, this kind of "truth in advertising" could provoke a significant
shift in the market for international arbitrator services. To the extent
that a "clean record" and good references or reviews become
meaningful professional credentials, the primary criteria for
ascendance in the international arbitration community may cease to
be reputation among members of "the club," and instead become
reputation among the actual consumers of international arbitration.
This shift in valuation criteria is unlikely to unseat the eminent
arbitrators, but it is more likely to create a more competitive market
for arbitrator services that would allow new entrants to rise up and
compete with already established arbitrators.
182. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
183. See Richard Silverberg et al., Best Practices in Large, Complex Cases: A
Practitioner's Guide, DisP. RESOL. J., May-June 2004, at 63, 73 (noting that
mediator resumes include references, while arbitrators' do not).
184. For example, see ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Aspen Publishers
1984), which provides a directory of all federal judges in the United States. For
each judge, they present a lawyer's evaluation, which provides specific critiques of
the judge's conduct, strengths and 'weaknesses, as well as basic biographical
information such as past and current positions, education, noteworthy rulings, and
media coverage. Id. If such a resource is useful to parties after they find out which
judge they must appear before, imagine how much more useful such information
would be to parties in their process of selecting an arbitrator.
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B. AN INCREASED ROLE FOR ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS
Improvements in market-based mechanisms cannot entirely
preclude the need for more direct oversight. Even with
improvements, some arbitrator misconduct will inevitably persist.
Meanwhile, vague standards of conduct and secretive decisions
regarding challenges continue to prevail even among the most
esteemed arbitral institutions; but these practices seem out of sync
with the justice-providing function of international arbitration and
the ever-increasing public realm in international arbitration. Instead
of secret and insulated decisions, as I have argued in my preceding
article, institutions should take on a more active role." 5 The relative
permanence and visibility of arbitral institutions, as compared to
individual arbitrators, and their intimate knowledge of, and direct
involvement in, arbitration practices and procedures gives them an
unrivaled institutional competence to regulate arbitrators.8 6 Given
their institutional competence, they are poised to become to
international arbitrators what bar associations are to lawyers. Arbitral
institutions, in other words, should formalize arbitrator qualifications
and entry requirements, improve mechanisms for reviewing claims
of alleged arbitrator misconduct, and impose real sanctions on
transgressing arbitrators.187 These changes necessarily imply a need
to intentionally separate the administrative functions of institutions
from the decision-making services provided by individual arbitrators.
There are some institutions that have already made important steps
in this direction. For example, the Chartered Institute for Arbitrators
("CIA") does not administer international arbitrations, but provides
various arbitration support services such as the nomination of
arbitrators. Even more explicitly than the directories described in
Part I, this institution borrows explicitly from the rhetoric of
professional licensing, and replicates its processes much more
definitively than either arbitral institutions or the arbitrator locator
sources described above. The CIA refers to itself as a "Professional
185. Rogers, Developing Standards of Conduct, supra note 6, at 110-12.
186. Cf Wilkins, supra note 53, at 884-85 (proposing in the attorney context
that regulators with the greatest institutional competence should be assigned
primary regulatory authority).
187. Currently, even if an arbitrator's award is later invalidated on grounds of
misconduct, they are likely to still receive their full fees.
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Organization for Arbitrators, Mediators and Adjudicators"' 88 and lists
having a "prestigious secondary professional qualification" as among
the benefits of membership.189 Unlike the informational directories
described above, however, the CIA has stringent, published entry
requirements, which may include extensive training, passing an
examination, and completing an interview. 90 It also has a relatively
detailed code of ethics that pertains to arbitrator members, and most
interesting of all, a grievance procedure for those who have
complaints about the conduct of arbitrators. 191
Similarly, the AAA has a stated policy of only nominating
"qualified" arbitrators from its existing rosters, which it advertises as
highly "select" and open only to a limited number of arbitrators. To
qualify, a candidate must attend training sessions administered by the
AAA, as well as possess certain minimum professional
qualifications. Moreover, the AAA rigorously enforces its code of
ethics through what has been referred to as a "one-strike-you're-out"
policy. Under this policy, any arbitrator whose awards are challenged
for improper non-disclosure goes on inactive status and will not be
nominated to future arbitrations while the judicial challenge is
pending. 192 Even after a final judicial decision, the AAA makes a
188. Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, Home, at http://www.arbitrators.org/ (last
visited June 15, 2005).
189. The CIA website describes that one of the benefits of membership is the
"opportunity to network with professionals engaged in a wide range of
disciplines." Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, Membership Benefits, at
http://www.arbitrators.org/Joining/benefits.asp (last visited Aug. 28, 2005).
190. Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, Special Member Assessment, at
http://www.arbitrators.org/Courses/SMA.asp (last visited Aug. 28, 2005).
191. It appears that the CIA tailored its grievance procedure to consumers
involved in the CIA's domestic consumer arbitration, and it is unclear whether an
adverse resolution of a complaint can affect an arbitrator's status as a member of
the CIA. See Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, DRS-CIArb, at http://www.drs-
ciarb.com/aboutus.asp (last visited Aug. 28, 2005). Since its initiation, complaints
appear to have overwhelmed the grievance procedure (evidently in the domestic
context). See Tony Bingham, Guilty As Charged (commenting that the grievance
procedure has also drawn some stiff rebuke from arbitrators who are, predictably,
resistant to being subjected to formal investigation of their conduct), at
http://www.tonybingham.co.uk/column/2002/20020517.htm (last visited Aug. 28,
2005). People are registering loud protests against what he characterizes as the trial
and "court-marshal" approach to arbitrator regulation. Id.
192. See AAA, Failure to Disclose, supra note 45.
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separate determination of whether the arbitrator should ever be
restored to active status on the roster.
The CIA, AAA, and a few other institutions that have taken on
strong formal commitments to ensure quality and monitor arbitrators
may reflect a developing regulatory competition among arbitral
institutions. Adoption of formal mechanisms to regulate arbitrators
may signal to the market their uniquely rigorous commitments to
ethical conduct and quality assurance, echoing the signaling function
that some scholars have argued exists in securities markets.
This competition among institutions will more likely result in a
race-to-the-top as opposed to a race-to-the-bottom, as was produced
by the nearly frantic competition among national arbitral sites. 93
While the market for national arbitral sites seems to have largely
self-corrected, there are significant differences in the incentives for
national sites and institutions, which suggest a race to the bottom is
unlikely. In the context of choosing a situs, parties might prefer
national contexts that promise minimal interference with the
arbitration proceedings or award. That same preference for non-
interference by situs courts, however, may provide an even stronger
need for institutions that provide enhanced reliability and procedural
protections.1 94
The historically important institutions, such as the ICC and the
LCIA, apparently feel less pressed to seek a competitive advantage
through increased and more transparent regulation of arbitrators.
193. See Christopher R. Drahazol, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and
International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 104 (2000).
In an effort to attract more international arbitration, however, many nations have
declined this opportunity and have instead legislated to constrain court review of
awards from arbitrations taking place within their boundaries. The most prominent
examples are Belgium (which prohibits national courts completely from
overturning any international arbitral award unless a Belgian citizen is a party,
even in the instance of arbitrator fraud) and Switzerland (which permits non-Swiss
parties to elect such prohibition by agreement). See Park, supra note 51, at 649.
While it is also possible to imagine a race to the bottom with institutions
competing to attract parties seeking to avoid mandatory law, those institutions
would also be signaling to national regulatory authorities that arbitrations under the
auspices of their rules are inherently suspect.
194. See supra note 121. Of course, the benefits of such regulatory competition
can only be realized if parties become more savvy in selecting institutions and
drafting their arbitration clauses.
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Even if they have not as yet suffered setbacks in caseloads, however,
they may still be risking the prospect of regulatory pre-emption if
they fail to act.
One sign of increased interest in formalizing institutions'
regulatory role is demonstrated by the Principles for ADR Service
Providers ("Principles"), which are the product of an innovative
project jointly undertaken by the CPR-Georgetown Commission on
Ethics and Standards of Practice in ADR chaired by Carrie Menkel-
Meadow. 95 Significantly, the Principles call on institutions to
establish formal procedures for pursuing grievances against
arbitrators as part of a larger effort to guide service providers in
meeting the expectations not only of parties, but also of "policy
makers and the public generally for fair, impartial and quality dispute
resolution." While not binding on institutions, the Principles may be
establishing background expectations that will be used to evaluate
institutions.
A failure of effective regulation by institutions could provoke state
intervention in the form of legislative efforts either to relax standards
for arbitrator immunity, as some scholars have proposed, 196 or to
assume more direct regulatory authority over international
arbitrators, as the SEC did in the context of lawyer regulation after
the Enron scandal. 197 In domestic contexts, in response to concerns
over inadequate existing controls, the Florida Supreme Court and the
Northern District of California have established review procedures
for complaints involving court-annexed ADR providers, 98 while the
195. See CPR-GEORGETOWN COMMISSION ON ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE IN ADR, PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS (2002)
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.cpradr.org/pdfs/finalProvider.pdf
(last visited Aug. 28, 2005). Carrie Menkel-Meadow is one of the most steadfast
and active proponents of increasing transparent ethical regulation in the provision
of dispute resolution services. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in
Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Processes: What's Happening and
What's Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 949, 950-51 (2002) (stressing that in the absence
of mechanisms for enforcement, "transparency, disclosure, rules, sanctions and
consequences [are] necessary for arbitration to maintain any semblance of legal
legitimacy and justice").
196. See Guzman, supra note 113, at 1279-80.
197. See Sullivan, supra note 180, at 1701.
198. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 195, at 12, n.30.
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California legislature has adopted aggressive new rules regulating
arbitrators more generally.'99 There is also an interesting proposal,
again under the tutelage of Professor Menkel-Meadow under the
auspices of the CPR-Georgetown cooperative, for a proposed new
Model Rule for Lawyers Acting as
Third Party Neutrals, which would be incorporated into the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. 00 While this proposal has a lot of
merit in the domestic context, it could pose some real problems in
the international context. If various national courts and national bar
associations begin devising and applying their own arbitral ethical
rules to international arbitrators who are also locally licensed
lawyers, those institutions will become venues for interpreting and
enforcing those rules °.2 0  As a consequence, the conduct of
international arbitrators would become subject to the very national
institutions from which arbitral decision-making is supposed to be
insulated.
199. The legislation was adopted after a local paper ran "a series of articles
featuring horror stories about the inequities of arbitration." See Ruth V. Glick,
California Arbitration Reform: The Aftermath, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 119, 120 (2003).
The rules were legislatively enacted to apply to all contractual arbitration in
California. In substance, the new rules substantially expand arbitrator disclosure
requirements and provide mechanisms for regulating arbitrator action. More
controversially, the new law increases the bases for disqualifying arbitrators, and
some speculate may increase the bases for vacating awards. Id. at 121-22. Notably,
the new ethical rules do not apply to international arbitrators. Id. at 123 n.26; see
also Ruth V. Glick, Should California 's Ethics Rules Be Adopted Nationwide?:
No! They Are Overbroad and Likely to Discourage Use of Arbitration, DisP.
RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at 13, 13-14; Judicial Council of California Adopts
Ethics Standards for Private Arbitrators, 13 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 176
(2002) (noting that notwithstanding adoption of new standards, several members
suspect that the volume of information that must be disclosed under California's
new standards "may be too burdensome" and could "be used too readily" to
disqualify arbitrators).
200. See CPR-GEORGETOWN COMMISSION ON ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE IN ADR, MODEL RULE FOR THE LAWYER AS THIRD-PARTY NEUTRAL
(2002), available at http://www.cpradr.org/pdfs/CPRGeorge-ModelRule.pdf (last
visited Aug. 28, 2005).
201. See Wilkins, supra note 53, at 810-11.
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C. MAKING THE JUSTICE AND PUBLIC FUNCTIONS EXPLICIT
FEATURES OF ARBITRATORS' ROLE
As explored in Part II, arbitrators often take cognizance of
international public policy or national mandatory law, even
sometimes when not part of the parties' express choice of law.2"2
This behavior seems to be generated by a sense of commitment to
larger public concerns, and is consistent with observed strategies of
successful professionals in other sectors, who have been drawn to
public-oriented activities that bring them more in line with the
transcendent values of their profession.0 3 The commitment to these
more public goals seems widely accepted, as illustrated in the
numerous articles,204 books, 20 5 and conferences 206 dedicated to the
issues of public importance in the international arbitration system.20 7
202. See supra notes 132-143 and accompanying text.
203. Bryant Garth also argues this point with respect to lawyers. See Bryant
Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War with the
Profession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 934-35 (1993).
204. See, e..Q., Bernardo M. Cremades & David J. A. Cairns, Corruption,
International Public Policy and the Duties of Arbitrators, Disp. RESOL. J., Nov.
2003-Jan. 2004, at 76, 84 (calling it "the greatest mistake" for a tribunal to ignore
suspicions of corruption); see also A. Timothy Martin, International Arbitration
and Corruption: An Evolving Standard, TRANSNAT'L Disp. MGMT., May 2004,
available at http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/samples/free
articles/tvl-2-article45a.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2005). Some years earlier, in
1986, the Eighth International Arbitration Congress in New York dedicated half
the conference to issues of public policy international arbitration, including bribery
and corruption, and the results of the Congress were published in COMPARATIVE
ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION (Sanders ed., 1986).
205. See generally ABDULHAY SAYED, CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Ch. 9 (2004); Ahmed Sadek El-Kosheri, Public
Policy Under Egyptian Law, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND
PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION (Sanders ed., 1986).
206. A recent conference on April 10, 2005 at Queen Mary College in London,
which includes among its speakers many of the most celebrated international
arbitrators, addressed the topic of "Contemporary Problems-Twenty-First Century
Issues." The ranges of issues discussed included not only the impact of
international public policy on corruption, but also a range of other issues with
broader social implications, such as trade in stolen art, human trafficking, and
illicit drugs, as well as other issues of a decidedly public nature, such as human
rights conventions, the relevance of mandatory law and the impact of arbitration on
third parties, and the teaching and training of international arbitrators. See
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It is reasonable to imagine that these public conversations about
the public realm of international arbitration, and established practices
regarding application of mandatory law, could be transformed into
prescribed rules to guide and evaluate arbitrators. Formal articulation
of these obligations would transform these practices from individual
discretion to professional obligation, and could have potentially
salutary benefits in the internal competitive pressures within the
market for arbitrator services. Some scholars hypothesize that ex ante
parties prefer arbitrators who are willing to disregard mandatory
rules, with the result that those arbitrators enjoy a competitive
advantage over others who are unwilling to disregard applicable
mandatory law.208 There is some reason to doubt this hypothesis in its
generally School of International Arbitration, Conference Programme, at
http://www.arbitrationonline.org/20th%20Anniversary (last visited Aug. 28, 2005).
207. Similarly, in the context of the U.S. legal profession, pro bono work and
public service used to be regarded as tied solely to a lawyer's sense of noblesse
oblige, but are now considered part of recognized expectations and valuable
professional opportunities. See Judith L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of
Lawyers' Pro Bono Responsibilities: From Chance Noblesse Oblige to Stated
Expectations, 77 TUL. L. REv. 91, 134 (2002); David B. Wilkins, Doing Well by
Doing Good? The Role of Public Service in the Careers of Black Corporate
Lawyers, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1, 20-27 (2004) (explaining how public service can
provide lawyers with experience, contacts and public recognition); David B.
Wilkins, From "Separate Is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity is Good for
Business ": The Rules of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the
Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1548, 1607 (2004) ("Although activities
such as government service, community and political participation, bar association
activity, and pro bono work are often cast in the lofty terms of noblesse oblige
professionalism, savvy lawyers have always realized that participating in these
activities also enhances their careers."); Garth, supra note 203, at 934 (noting that
those "successful lawyers who aspire to become 'great' lawyers ... have been
drawn to 'public-spirited' civil justice issues, whether their 'motives' were self-
interested or to further the public interest"). Arbitral institutions have also been
commendably active at this level. For example, the ICC has acted at a political
level through committees and forums to affect national legislation and
jurisprudence regarding issues such as bribery. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note
2, at 45-46 & n.24 (describing ICC involvement in resolving the question of the
effect of contracts after the destruction of the Soviet bloc and the problem of
international bribery). In addition, most institutions, including the iaiparis and the
CIA, hold regular seminars and meetings to discuss past and future developments
in international arbitration practice.
208. See Guzman, supra note 113, at 1282 (hypothesizing that by ignoring
applicable mandatory rules, arbitrators can "develop a reputation as a desirable
arbitrator" and thus increase their chances at future selection).
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strongest form, since parties instead appear committed to having
established rules justify arbitral outcomes,20 9 and international
arbitrators appear to be instead "deeply concerned" about their
reputations for respecting mandatory rules. 210 Even if it does not tell
the full story, however, international arbitrators may nevertheless be
attentive to the negative repercussions of ruling against both parties'
wishes.
Formal articulation would transform disregard of mandatory law
or international public policy from its supposed status as a
competitive advantage into an aberrant behavior. This transformation
would not guarantee that arbitrators who continue to disregard
mandatory law and public policy will be rejected by future parties,
but it may lead to stigmatization in the arbitration community, a
sanction that is less plausible when the nature of the obligation
remains ambiguous and presumptively optional. It may also become
a basis for evaluating arbitrators' competence and qualifications to
serve in future arbitrations, as well as a basis for the international
arbitration system to reassure concerned States that national
mandatory laws are receiving appropriate deference.
Obviously, there are significant obstacles to articulating such
rules, particularly given the complexities involved in determining
applicable mandatory law in any given case (let alone across the
spectrum of all cases),"' and in articulating the content of
international public policy.21 2 Overcoming these obstacles is not
entirely inconceivable, however, as illustrated by a similar proposal
209. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
210. See Posner, supra note 137, at 668 ("The evidence suggests that
international arbitrators are deeply concerned about their reputation for respecting
mandatory rules."). Building a reputation for refusing to apply mandatory law
through particular cases, the awards for which may or may not be published and
readily accessible, would be far inferior to publishing articles arguing against
application of mandatory law. But most prominent arbitrators who have taken a
public stand on the issue have expressed a commitment to apply mandatory law.
See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
211. See generally Carlo Croff, The Applicable Law in International
Commercial Arbitration: Is it Still a Conflict of Laws Problem?, 16 INT'L LAW.
613 (1982); Vitek Danilowicz, The Choice of Applicable Law in International
Arbitration, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 235 (1986).
212. See supra notes 175-178 and accompanying text.
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in 1980 by the Commission on Law and Commercial Practices of the
International Chamber of Commerce. The proposal would have
expressly authorized (not required) arbitrators to disregard or
supplement parties choice of law to take cognizance of otherwise
applicable mandatory law, and to take account of the purposes and
effects of such law in making the decision to do so.213 Ultimately,
these provisions were not adopted, but the general commitment to
mandatory law or public policy may be better established today and
the need to manifest that commitment may be more important today.
The international arbitration system relies on national legal
systems both to enforce awards and to remain unobtrusive in the
arbitral process.214 Abuse of national mandatory law may well be
something that erodes that support or provokes more exacting review
of awards," 5 as the U.S. Supreme Court threatened was possible if
U.S. antitrust laws were disregarded in international arbitration. A
single highly controversial ruling can also prompt legislative
reaction, as some have predicted will be part of the political fallout to
some recent, acutely unpopular NAFTA arbitration decisions. 1 6
213. One of the draft proposals provided:
[E]ven when the arbitrator does not apply the law of a certain country as the
law governing the contract he may nevertheless give effect to mandatory rules
of the law of that country if the contract or the parties have a close contact to
that country and if and in so far as under its law those rules must be applied
whatever be the law applicable to the contract. On considering whether to
give effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be had to their nature and
purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-application.
Reza Baniassadi, Do Mandatory Rules of Public Law Limit Choice of Law in
International Commercial Arbitration, 10 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 59, 63-64
(1992).
214. See Park, supra note 51, at 649 (noting that national courts may be required
to intervene at several points to assist the arbitral process).
215. Many scholars have argued for enhanced award review to correct arbitrator
misapplication or non-application of mandatory law. See, e.g., Thomas
Carbonneau, Le Tournoi of Academic Commentary on Kaplan: A Reply to
Professor Rau, Mealey's INT'L ARB. REP., Apr. 1997, at 13 (arguing that courts
should be more willing to "police" awards by "reinvigorating the grounds of...
the public policy exception to enforcement might provide some semblance of a
corrective procedure against the exercise of excessive or misguided arbitral
authority on public law issues").
216. See Carbonneau, supra note 17, at 827.
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CONCLUSION
In this Essay, I have tried to articulate clearer vision of the
vocation of the international arbitrator, based not on hyperbole, but
on conceptual analysis of their role, an accounting of actual
practices, and an appreciation of the market forces that affect their
practice.
International arbitrator's justice function and participation in a
system that includes an active public realm are firmer normative
foundations for the arbitrator's vocation than the hypothetical
assumptions about altruism were for the U.S. lawyer. These
foundations, and arbitrators' espousals of professional ideals, are all
the more likely, however, to create expectations about how
international arbitrators will perform their duties. Against the
backdrop of these expectations, international arbitration practice
continues to operate in a market largely characterized by information
asymmetries and barriers to entry. In the short term, the incentives
for seriously improving the transparency and fortitude of self-
regulation may not seem obvious. But if the contrast between
expectations and the market realities becomes too great, external
forces will inevitably move in to fill the gap. Given that the strength
of the international arbitration system depends largely on its ability
to operate independently of nation-states, while still enjoying their
support at critical junctures, the prospect of State interference poses a
threat not simply to the "professional autonomy" of international
arbitrators, but to the health of the entire system.
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